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NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
Case No.: C\I \3- zquz- L 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the above-named Petitioner, the NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
("NEA"), by and through its counsel of record, Paul J. Stark, General Counsel, Idaho Education 
Association, for and as claims against the above-named Respondents PETITIONS AND 
ALLEGES as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. At all times relevant hereto, the NEA was and is the recognized representative for 
the members of the Nampa Education Association ("Teachers"). 
2. Respondent Nampa School District No. 131 ("School District") is a corporate and 
political body existing and located within the county of Canyon, state of Idaho. 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT- I 
000004 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
3. The jurisdiction of this Court over this matter is pursuant to Idaho Code § 1-705. 
4. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404. Jurisdiction and 
venue are proper in this court pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 5-404, 5-514, 10-1201, et seq., and the 
Idaho State Constitution Art. V, 20. 
FACTS GIVING RISE TO PETITIONER'S PETITION 
5. In the summer of 2012, the Teachers signed a Standard Teacher Contract on a 
form approved by the state superintendent of public instruction for the 2012-2013 school year. 
6. The Standard Teacher Contract established the terms and conditions of the 
Teachers' employment for the 2012-2013 school year. 
7. The Standard Teacher Contract form approved by the state superintendent of 
public instruction provides: 
It is understood and agreed between the parties that this Contract is subject to the 
applicable laws of the State of Idaho, the duly adopted rules of the State Board of 
Education and the policies of the District which are, by reference, incorporated 
herein and made a part of this agreement the same as if fully set forth herein. 
8. The Standard Teacher Contract form approved by the state superintendent of 
public instruction also provides: 
The terms of this Contract shall be subject to amendment and adjustment to 
conform to the terms of either a Master Contract or the compensation established 
the Board of Trustees pursuant to Section 33-1274, Idaho Code, as such terms are 
applicable for the same school year as this Contract. 
9. On or about the week of December 10, 2012, the School District began a 
systematic plan where teachers working for the School District were required to attend 
mandatory "emergency" meetings conducted by the teachers' immediate supervisory, often the 
teachers' building principal. 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 2 
10. At those meetings, teachers were pressured by the School District to modify the 
terms of their Standard Teachers Contract by signing another contract for employment entitled 
"Addendum Contract." 
11. The "Addendum Contracts," if signed, were an agreement to take four ( 4) unpaid 
furlough days between January and May, 2013. 
12. The School District required that these "Addendum Contracts" be signed and 
returned no later than Monday, December 17, 2012. 
13. On December 14, 2012, the Teachers wrote a letter to the Superintendent of the 
School District objecting on the basis that the "Addendum Contracts" violated Idaho Code §33-
513(1) because the "Addendum Contracts" were not a written contract approved by the state 
superintendent of public instruction. 
14. On December 18, 2012, the Teachers again wrote the School District objecting to 
the "Addendum Contracts" with the additional basis that the "Addendum Contracts" violated the 
Rules of the Idaho State Department of Education (IDAPA 08.02.01.150), which provide: 
DEVIATION FROM STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FORM. 
The State Superintendent of Public Instruction has approved a standard 
employment contract form. Any deviation from this contract form must be 
approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and reviewed for 
reapproval once every three (3) years. (Section 33-513, Idaho Code) 
15. The School District replied, disputing the Teachers' arguments. 
COUNT ONE 
Declaratory Judgment 
16. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference hereby all the allegations 
contained in Paragraphs 1 through 15 of this Petition as if fully set forth herein. 
17. The Standard Teachers Contract constitutes a binding and enforceable contract. 
18. There is an actual controversy involving a genuine dispute between the Teachers 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 3 
06 
and the School District concerning their respective rights and duties under the Standard Teacher 
Contracts entered into for the 2012-2013 school year. Specifically, the parties hereto disagree 
concerning the interpretation of the "Addendum Contract" and whether the "Addendum 
Contract" is lawful under Idaho law. 
19. Petitioner and Respondent have not sought to have their respective rights and 
duties adjudicated or determined in any other legal proceeding and until the aforesaid 
controversy is judicially determined as requested herein, none of the parties will be able to 
ascertain and act on their said rights and duties. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
As a result of the Respondent's actions as set forth above, Petitioner has been required to 
enlist the services of Paul J. Stark, General Counsel to the Idaho Education Association, to 
prosecute this action and has incurred, and will continue to incur, costs and attorney fees for 
which it is entitled to a separate award pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 and Rule 54( e )(1) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure as well as any other applicable statute or rule or contract between 
the parties, in an amount to be determined by the Court, or, if judgment is rendered by default, in 
the amount of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00). 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Petitioner Nampa Education Association prays for judgment against the Respondent, and 
each of them, as follows: 
1. On each of the bases set forth herein, this Court enter a declaratory judgment 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1201, et seq. declaring the "Addendum Contracts" to be unlawful 
and unenforceable; 
2. For an award of attorney fees and costs; 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 4 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this2.~ay of March, 2013. 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 5 
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William F. Yost, ISB No. 1242 
Yost Law, PLLC 
4 Ogden A venue 
PO Box 1275 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Telephone: 208-466-9222 
Facsimile: 208-466-1981 
Attorney for Respondent F I A.b:t5 q,M. 
APR 1 8 2013 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, 
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vs. 
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, 
Respondent. 
) 








ANSWER TO PETITION FOR 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
_______________ ) 
COMES NOW the Respondent, NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, by and through 
its counsel of record, William F. Yost, of Yost Law, PLLC, and as and for its answer to Petitioner's 
Petition on file herein, admits and denies and alleges as follows: 
1. Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 17. 
2. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 
15, 18, and 19. 
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 1 
3. In answering paragraph 8, Respondent can neither admit nor deny the allegations 
contained in those paragraphs as and for the reason that the documents referred to therein will speak 
for and establish the terms and conditions of the contract agreement. 
4. In answering paragraph 16, Respondent answers and incorporates by reference all its 
answers to paragraphs 1 through 15, inclusive, of the Petition. 
5. Respondent denies each and every allegation contained m the Petition not 
specifically admitted herein. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
By stating certain defenses as "affirmative defenses," Respondent does so for the purpose 
of completeness and does not intend to suggest that it has the burden of proof of any such 
defense. Furthermore, Respondent has not had the opportunity to conduct discovery in this case 
and, by failing to raise an affirmative defense, cross-claim or counterclaim, does not intend to 
waive any such defense and/or claim, and Respondent specifically reserves the right to amend its 
answer to include additional affirmative defenses and to file any such cross-claim or 
counterclaim. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
No Cause of Action 
Petitioner's Petition fails to state a cause of action against Respondent upon which relief 
may be granted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Lack of Standing 
To the extent Petitioner lacks standing with respect to any claims, those claims should be 
dismissed. 
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 2 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Compliance with Statutory Requirements 
The Petition must fail against Respondent, as Respondent was fulfilling required duties as 
provided by law. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Mootness 
To the extent any claim is moot or not ripe for adjudication, that claim should be dismissed. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Failure to Join an Indispensable Party 
To the extent Petitioner has failed to join an indispensable party with respect to any claims, 
those claims should be dismissed. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Estoppel 
To the extent Petitioner has been estopped from pleading a claim with respect to any claims, 
those claims should be dismissed. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Failure of Contract 
To the extent there was not a valid contract between Petitioner and Respondent with respect 
to any claims, those claims should be dismissed. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Failure of Consideration 
To the extent there was not sufficient consideration to create a valid contract between 
Petitioner and Respondent with respect to any claims, those claims should be dismissed. 
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 3 
01.1. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Lack of Privity 
To the extent no privity of contract exists between Respondent and Petitioner with respect to 
any claims, those claims should be dismissed. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Illegality 
In the alternative, to the extent a contract existed between Petitioner and Respondent, and 
that contract was unenforceable due to illegality, with respect to any claims, those claims should be 
dismissed. 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Lack of Capacity 
To the extent Petitioner lacks capacity with respect to any claims, those claims should be 
dismissed, including, but not limited to, the following averments: 
(a) Petitioner alleges representation of unknown parties; 
(b) Petitioner has no legal existence as Petitioner has no contractual relationship 
with Respondent; 
( c) Petitioner has failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of Idaho Code 
Section 33-1271, as amended. 
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
No Contract Between Respondent and Individual Teachers 
Respondent requested voluntary furlough days from certified staff, and furlough days were 
voluntarily contributed by over one-half of the certified staff. 
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 4 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Respondent hereby requests that it be awarded its attorney fees and costs incurred herein 
pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-117 and 12-121 and Rule 54(e)(l), IRCP. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Having answered, Respondent prays that Petitioner take nothing by its Petition herein, that 
the same be dismissed and that Respondent be awarded its attorney fees and costs. 
~ 
DATED this J ~ day of April, 2013. 
YOST LAW, PLLC 
By:~-~ 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this / g:1'i day of April, 2013, I caused to be served by the 
method indicated below a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon: 
Paul J. Stark 
Idaho Education Association 
620 North 6th St 
PO Box 2638 




x_ Facsimile No. 344-1606 
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William F. Yost, ISB No. 1242 
Yost Law, PLLC 
4 Ogden A venue 
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Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Telephone: 208-466-9222 
Facsimile: 208-466-198 l 
Attorney for Respondent 
\ ½ O I A,k_E_~.M. 
JUN O 5 2013 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, 
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COMES NOW the Respondent, NAi\ifPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, by and through 
its counsel of record, William F. Yost and Chip Giles, of Yost Law, PLLC, and moves this Court, 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, for a complete summary judgment in 
Respondent's favor. 
This motion is based upon the documents and pleadings on file in tbis matter, together 
with the Affidavit of Steven Kipp in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summa..-y Judgment, and 
the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, all filed contemporaneously 
herewith. 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUbGMENT- 1 
00001.4 
Respectfully submitted tilis 5th day of June) 2013. 
YOST LAW, PLLC 
By:. le-: 
Chip Giles 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of June, 2013, I caused 10 be served by foe method 
indicated below a true an.d correct copy of the foregoing document upon: 
Paul J. Stark 
Idaho Education Association 
620 North 6th St 
POBox2638 
Boise, ID 83701 
_U.S.Mail 
_Overnight Mail 
_Hand Deli very 
lL Facsimile No. 344*1606 
Chip Giles 
RBSPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 2 
00001.s 
William F. Yost, ISB No. 1242 
Chip Giles, ISB No. 9135 
YOST LAW, PLLC 
4 Ogden A venue 
PO Box 1275 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Telephone: 208-466-9222 
Facsimile: 208A66-1981 
Attorneys for Respondent 
• ._..'""._. ,. ~•V'L' -1.f UUL.,l_l l.: ILJ..J.i 
,£ o I A,~_E___.q.M. 
JUN O 5 2013 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
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OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 





) Case No. CV 2013-2962-C 
) 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION F'OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) 
) 
) __________ ) 
COMES NOW Respondent, NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131 ("District"); by its 
counsel ofrecord, William F. Yost and Chip Giles, of Yost Law, PLLC, and files this Memorandum 
in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment: 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
1. On July 1, 2011, Idaho Senate Bill 1108 was enacted by emergency measure as part 
of Idaho's Students Come First legislation. The new Bill amended Idaho Code Section 33-1274A 
(2) to include the following regarding teacher contract negotiations: 
(2) Should the local education association or the board of 
trustees fail to ratify and approve the written agreement as provided for in 
this section, lh.e board of trustees shall establish other compensation tenns, as 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUlvf •. MARY- ruDGMENT - 1 
00001.6 
independently detemrined by the board and not controlied by 1he tenns 
which failed ratification, for professional employees as provided in section 
33-1274, Idaho Code. Provided however, that such compensation shall 
reflect the last best good faith offer proposed by the board during 
negotiations. 
2. Section 33-1274A remai..r1ed effect until November 21, 2012, when Governor 
Otter issued a proclamation formally repealing the Students Come First legislation pursuant to the 
November 8, 2012 referendum votes on Propositions One, Two and Three. 
3. The pre-referendu .. '11 version of Idaho Code Section 33-1274 was in effect in the 
Spring and Summer of 2012, when the District began master contract negotiations \vith the Nampa 
teachers' union, the Nampa Education Association ("NEA"), to negotiate compensation and 
economic benefits for teachers. 
4. An agreement regarding compensation and economic benefits was never reached, 
and a master contract between the District and the Union was never formalized. Under the then-
existing version ofidaho Code 33-1274, the District's last best offer \Vas imposed. 
5. Teachers were required to sign individual standard contracts with the District 
establishit1g the District's last best offer as the teacher compensation and economic benefits for the 
2012-2013 school year. 
6. In the Fall of 2012, a :financial audit revealed a $4.3 rr.iillion deficit in the District 
budget. 
7. Due to the budget deficit, the District was forced to make drastic cost cutting 
measures in.eluding the closure of one school. The District Board of Trustees and administrators 
began exploring additional options to keep th.e District solvent. 
8. In order to make payroll and keep facilities open, the District refmanced certain 
school bonds, ran a supplemental school levy which was approved by voters, obtained judicial 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR Sl11vfMARY ruDGMENT ~ 2 
approval to enable borrmving, contracted with private vendors to provide school maintenance, and 
approached teachers with the option of volunteering for up to four furlough days. 
9. In early December 2012, the District presented teachers with a volunta..ry agreement 
in the fonn attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this reference incorporated herein ("Addendum 
Contract"). 
10. The Addendum Contract provided teachers the voluntary option of taking furlough 
days to assist the District in managing cash flow and meeting financial obligations. The Addendum 
Contract defined all furlough days as voluntary. 
11. Teachers were presented the option of taking any or all of four (4) voluntary 
furlough days on the following dates: January 4) 2013; March 8, 2013; March 22, 2013~ and May 
31, 2013. The proposed dates were teacher work days, or other non-student days, and therefore had 
no impact on student-teacher cont.<tet days. 
12. Teachers were allowed to choose any or all proposed furlough days by circling the 
dates they desired on the Addendum Contract. 
13. In early December 2012, District administration conducted meetings with teachers 
regarding the District's financial issues and to present teachers with the voluntary Addendum 
Contract. 
14. As a result of the meetings with teachers and adrr,jnistration, 545 staff members (501 
certified teachers and 44 administrative staff) volunteered one or more furlough days. After the 
meetings, 24 certified teachers later modified their agreements adding to, or reducing, the number of 
volunteered furlough days. 
15. On December 14, 2012, and again on December 18, 2012, General Counsel for the 
NEA wrote to Superintendent Thomas Michaelson, claiming the voluntary Addendrnn Contracts 
were illegal and unenforceable. 
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16. On December 18, 2012 Counsel for the District sent a letter to the NEA regarding 
the Addendum Contracts. It was explained that if immediate measures were not taken to address the 
District's financial issues, t,.1-ie District would be faced with the inability to pay personnel, vendors, 
and other contract services, perhaps as early as April 2013. In conclusion the letter requested 
leadership, guidance and cooperation from the NEA to address the DistJ.ict's budget deficit. 
17. On March 25, 2013 the NEA filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment ii.1. the Third 
Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho. 
18. The NEA alleges that its members were coerced into signing the Addendum 
Contract and that the Addendum Contract violated Idaho Code Section 33-513(1), because it was 
not a written contract approved by the State Superi.ntendent of Public Instruction. 
19. The NEA requested a declaratory judgment pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1201, et 
seq., declaring the Addendum Contracts to be unlawful and unenforceable. 
20. The District now moves for summary judgment on all issues raised in the Petition. 
ST AA'DARD OF REVIEW 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide that sum...-rnary judgment is proper "if the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
In order to defeat a Motion for Summary Judgment, a party must prove a specific and 
sufficient issue as to a material fact The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled: "A mere scintilla of 
evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts" is not sufficient to create a genuine issue for 
purposes of smnmary judgment. Harpole v. Stare, 131 Idaho 437,439,958 P.2d 594,596 (1998). 
The non-moving party "must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts 
showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Turtle v. Sudenga Indus., Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 150, 
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868 P.2d 473, 478 (1994). "The non-moving party must submit more tha..ti. just conclusory 
assertions that an issue of material fact exjsts to establish a genuine issue." Coghlan v. Beta 
Theta Pi .Fraternity, 133 Idaho 401, 987 P.2d 313, 304 (1999). ''Smru:nary judgment is 
appropriate where the non-moving party bearing the burden of proof fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element the center for that patty's case." Carnell v. 
Barker Management Incorporated, 137 Idaho 322,327, 48 P.3d 651, 656 (2002). Thus, absent a 
non-moving party's presentation of facts sufficient to prove a genuine trial issue, the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. 
"On Motion for Summary Judgment, the moving party bears the initial burden of proving 
the absence ofmate1ial fact issues." Sherer v. Pocatello School Disr. No. 25, 143 Idaho 486,489, 
148 P.3d 1232, 1235 (2006). "Only then does the burden shift to the non-rnoving palty to come 
forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact." Id at 489-90, 148 
P.3d at 1235-36. Additionally: "disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party, 
and all reasonable inferences that can be dravm from the record are drawn in favor of the non-
moving party." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 
P .3d 641, 644 (2006). Therefore, the initial burden is on the party seeking summary judgment, 
and ultimately disputed facts will be construed in favor of the non-moving party. 
Finally, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide that when presenting affidavits, they 
"shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
and shall show affinnatively that the a:..ffiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." 
I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
ARGUMENT 
A. RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE PETITIONER 
LACKS STANDING. 
Idaho Courts have ruled that 'Justiciability is generally divided into subcategories --
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advisory opinions, feigned and collusive cases; standing; ripeness, mootness, political questions; and 
administrative questions." Miles v. Idaho Power, 116 Idaho 635, 639 778 P.2d 757, 761 (Idaho 
1989). Regarding standing, Ida.li.o Courts have held "it is a fondamental tenet of American 
jurisprudence that a person wishing to invoke a court's jurisdiction must have standing." Van 
Va/kenburgh v. Citizensfor Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000). Based 
on the facts of tl1is case, it is the District's position that the NEA lacks standing to bring a petition 
for Declaratory Judgment. 
In 1989, the Idaho Supreme Court applied the following three-factor analysis to detennine 
standing in Miles v. Idaho Power Co.: 
(1) Standing "focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the 
issues the party \Vishes to have adjudicated;" (2) Th.at i,_-,_ order "to 
satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants 
generally must allege or demonstrate an . injury in fact and a 
substantial likelihood ihat the judicial relief requested v.rill prevent or 
redress the claimed injury;'' and (3) That "a citizen and taxpayer may 
not challenge the governmental enactment or the injury as one 
separate alleged by all citizens and taxpayers of the ju..risdiction." 
Miles v. Idaho Power Co, 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989) (citing Valley Forge 
Christian College v. Americans United/or Separation o/Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 102 
S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982)); see also Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 
Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996). 
Thus, to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must 
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief 
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. Miles at 116 Idaho at 641. In Miles, the 
Court also found that standing requires a showing of a "distinct palpable injury" and a ''fairly 
traceable causal connection between the claim.ed injury and the challenged conduct." Id at 639. 
Palpable is defined as follows: "l. Tangible; capable of being touched or felt; 2. Noticeable; easily 
perceptible; and 3. Manifest; easily perceptible by the mind.;' ''Palpable." Merriam-Webster.com 
MEMOR.~NDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUM.r\i!ARY JUDGMENT - 6 
Merriam-Webster, 2011. Web. 22 May 2013. 
The NEA seeks a judgment declaring the Addendum Contracts to be unlawful and 
unenforceable. In order to invoke this Court's jurisdiction, the NEA must prove standing, and at a 
minimum satisfy the first two applicable prongs of the three part .Miles test. First, the NEA has not 
alleged an injury in fact. The NEA cannot prove that the voluntary signing of an agreement resulted 
in injury to any NEA member. Therefore, the NEA does not meet the first prong of the Miles test. 
Second, assuming existence of an injury, there is no m::elihood the relief requested by the 
District would prevent or redress the claimed iajury. The District presented teachers with the 
.Addendum Contracts as a one-time measure to address an inu:nediate and substantial budget 
concern. A judgment granti..I1g the NEA's request for relief would declare a previously executed and 
fully performed contract is (or was), unlawful and unenforceable. This does nothing to prevent or 
redress any Lajury, actual or alleged. Tims; the NEA fails under the second prong of the Miles test. 
The process surrounding the Addendum Contracts was completely voluntary. It is 
impossible that a distinct and palpable injury could stem from a voluntary act. Since the NEA 
cannot articulate a distinct and palpable injm-y, there is no traceable causal connection to the alleged 
conduct. Thus; in addition to failing the Miles test, the NEA fails to prove standing under the 
distinct, palpable and directly traceable analysis set forth by Idaho Courts. 
A recent discussion of the standing doctri.rie occurred in the case; In re: Jerome Board of 
Commissioners. TI1e ColLrt applied an associational standing analysis in addition to the Miles test. 
Citing the decision in Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass 'n, Inc. v. State ex rel. Andrus, the Court found, "as 
applied to associations seeking standing for its members, this Court considers whether the 
association has alleged that at least one of its members face inju.ry and could meet foe requirements 
of standing on an individual basis." In re Jerome County Bd ofCom'rs; 153 Idaho 298,281 P.3d 
1076, 1082 (2012). 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7 
In re.· Jerome County concerned the approval of a pennit for a Concentrated Animal 
Feeding Operation ("CA.PO") by the Jerome County Board of County Commissioners ("Board;'). 
Several individuals and organizations were opposed to the CAFO because of potential harms to 
neighboring farms and the Minidoka Historic Site. Several of these groups petitioned the District 
Court for review of the Board's decision. The District Court affirmed the Board'·s approval of the 
permit, ruling that four of the organizations concerned with the effects of the CAFO on the 
Minidoka National Historic Site lacked standing. Several of the objecting parties appealed the 
District Court decision, and asked the Idaho Supreme Court to find that the parties had standing to 
challenge the pem1it approval. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that every group but one had standing to appeal the 
Board's decision. The CotLrt: mled that groups with members whose primary residences were within 
one mile of the proposed site, or adjacent to the proposed site could be severely affected, and face 
potential harm, if the proposed site were developed. Id at I 082. Since the proposed site would 
create a redressable injury for at least one member of each group, the coun reasoned that these 
groups met the requirements to establish associational standing. 
The Court, however, denied standing to a group that "could not provide a specific allegation 
that any identified member of t½.e group live in proximity to the proposed CAFO site, or would be 
banned by its presence," a.11d "at best voiced concerns on behalf of unidentified members of their 
organizations, none of whom individually would have standmg to participate in an appeal." Id at 
1088. 
It is unlikely any }.rEA member can show they have, or would be hai.-med by, the existence 
or the signing of a voluntary furlough agreement. Furthermore, the NEA can..'1ot claim associational 
standing since no one member faces injury, or could meet the requirements of standing on an 
individual basis. The ~'EA' s failure to satisfy the Miles test, or the Idaho requirements for 
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associational standing is fatal to its request for declaratory relief. Therefore, due to lack of standing, 
summary judgment should be awarded in favor of the District. 
B. RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE ISSUES 
ALLEGED BY THE PETITIONER ARE NOW MOOT. 
Idaho Courts have found an issue is moot if it "presents no justiciable controversy and a 
judicial detem1ination will have no practical effect upon the outcome." Idaho County Property 
Owners Ass'n., Inc. v. Syringa General Hosp. Dist., 119 Idaho 309, 315, 805 P.2d 1233, 1239 
(1991). The District's opinion in this case is no justiciable controversy exists, and any argument 
raised in relation to the voluntary Addendum Contract is moot. Therefore, any judicial 
determination would have no practical effect upon the outcome. 
Idaho County Property O,,.mers Ass'r1. involved a request by the Idaho County Property 
Owner's Association for an injunction preventing.thee Sytjnga General Hospital District from 
expending taxes levied by the District. The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that at the time summary 
judgment was heard on the issue, there remained a substantial amount of money in lhe capital 
improvement fund, and the inju.11.mion requested would have been effective in preventing the 
ha:nn of which the plaintiffs complained. Id at 315. Due to the existence of money in the capital 
improvement fund, and the fact that an iajunction would prevent harm to the plaintiffs, the Court 
found a justiciable controversy and rnled that the mootness doctrine did not apply. 
Idaho Courts have also ruled that an issue will become moot "if it does not present a real 
and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded" by judicial relief. Koch v. 
Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 163, 177 P.3d 372, 377 (2008). In Koch, the Supreme Court 
considered whether a group of Ca.11yon County taxpayers had standing to litigate the 
constitutionality of a lease agreement entered into by the County and whether the issue was moot 
once the County purchased and later sold the real property previously subject to the lease 
agreement. The Court held that since the pre-existing lease agreement was no longer in effect, 
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and on remand to the District Court for further proceedings, the Court could not grant the 
plaintiffs any specific relief regarding the lease agreement. The Supreme Court dismissed the 
appeal as moot, since no exception to the mootness doctrine applied. id 
By the time this motion is argued, performance of Lhe voluntary Addendum Contracts 
between teachers and the District will be complete, and no live controversy will exist. Judicial 
action declaring the Addendun1. C()ntracts unlawful and unenforceable will do nothing to prevent 
any ham1 complained of by the NEA. Furthermore, the NEA has failed to establish the existence 
of •'a real and substantial controversy, which is capable of being concluded." As a result, any 
issue raised by the NEA in relation to the voluntary Addendum Contracts is now moot. 
In light of the above analysis, IdElJ10 courts have provided the following exceptions to the 
mootness doctrine: "(1) \Vhen there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on 
the person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review 
and thus is capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of 
substantial public interest." Ametitel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 
851-52, 119 P.3d 624, 626-27 (2005). 
Idaho courts have routinely applied factor one in the criminal context. Generally, 
11collateral legal consequences" have been found to include civil disabilities associated with 
criminal convictions, such as being "barred from holding certain offices, voting in state elections, 
and serving as ajuror.u State v. Shepperd, 38286 Court of Appeals ofldaho September 15, 2011, 
citing United States v. Mercurris, 192 F.3d 290,293 (2d Cir. 1999). 
The Supreme Court additionally held "potential relitigation of a...r1 undecided issue is not 
the type of collateral consequence contemplated under this exception. In effect, the State is 
asking this Court to issue an advisory opinion in order to avoid the issue in future cases; an 
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exercise this Court will not undertake." State v. Barclay, 232 P.3d 327, 149 Idaho 6 (Idaho 
2010). 
If Declaratory relief is not "'~·"""'"''",.., in this case there will be no future collateral legal 
consequences, such as precluding eligibility to hold state office, voting rights, or eligibility to 
serve as a juror. Furthennore, a court is not compelled to hear further argument related to a 
voluntary Addendum Contract, already executed and performed, because to do so would ask the 
court to issue an advisory opinion. Therefore, absent potential collateral legal consequences any 
argument raised in relation to the voluntary Addendum Contracts does not invoke facror one of 
the mootness analysis. Furthermore, declaratory relief in this case would force the Court to issue 
an advisory opinion. 
Idaho courts have applied the second exception to the mootness doctrine to criminal 
appeals upon completion of a penitentiary sentence. The exception applies to these cases since 
ordinarily any issue raised in relation to a prison sentence would be considered moot once the 
sentence was served. However, to dismiss such an action as moot would allow a sentencing issue 
to evade judicial review, and become capable ofrepetition. See Russell v. Fortri.ey, 722 P .2d 490, 
111 Idaho 181 (Idaho App. 1986), }vfalle,y v. Lewis, 678 P.2d 19, 106 Idaho 227 (Idaho 1983). 
Additionally, Idaho courts have applied the second exception in the domestic law context, 
analyzing a father's right to designate visitation with his child to another family member, while 
serving in the military overseas. Even though the father had returned from service, and would 
have no need to designate his visitation rights, the court found the issue to fall within the 
mootness exception because the father was still eligible for re-deployment as an enlisted member 
of the National Guard, and since other enlisted persons could face the same issue regarding 
designation of visitation. As a result, the issue regarding designation of visitation rights could 
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evade judicial review, and become capable of repetition. See Webb v. Webb, 148 P.3d 1267, 143 
Idaho 521,524 (Idaho 2006). 
The Idaho Supreme applied the third "public interest" mootness exception. when 
the substantive issue presented was whether public entities could use public funds to campaign in 
an election. The Court applied the exception declaring a public entity's use of public funds for 
election campaigns "an issue of substa.TJ.tial public interest that this Court has not yet addressed." 
The Court employed the exception heard argument on the issue to "provide guidance and 
direction in the future." Ameritel Inns, inc. v. Greater Boise Auditoriwn Dist., 119 P.3d 624, 141 
Idaho 849, 852 (Idaho 2005). 
Conversely, in Koch (previously cited), the Idaho Supreme Court refused to apply the 
public interest exception when the issue presented to the Court was whether a property lease 
agreement between Canyon County a..'fld a private entity violated the provisions of Article VIII, 
§ 3, of the Idaho Constitution. The Court held that since "the district court has not yet ruled on 
whether the particular lease agreement in this case vioiates Article VIII, § 3, rema...11.ding the case 
for the district court to ma.lee that determination when it would not resolve any dispute between 
the parties and would simply be asking the court to make an advisory opinion." Koch 145 Idaho 
158, 160. 
The Addendum Contracts at issue in the NEN s complaint differ from appeal of a 
criminal sentence already served, and the designation of visitation rights for overseas service 
members since the Addendum Contracts were voluntary and will be completely performed by 
the time this Motion is argued. Thus, the second mootness exception does not apply. 
Additionally, the signing of an agreement to volunteer a furlough day does not trigger a 
high degree of public interest, such as the use of public funds for an election campaign. Much 
like the lease issue presented in Koch, an adjudication declaring the Addendu.111 Contracts 
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unlawful and unenforceable would not resolve any dispute between the parties, and would 
request an advisory opinion from the Court. Thus, the public interest exception to the mootness 
doctrine does not apply. 
Based on the above, any issue raised by Petitioner in relation to the voluntary Addendum 
Contract is now moot, and does not fall under any exception to the mootness doctrine. Therefore, 
summary judgment should be entered in favor of the District 
C. RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE ISSUES 
ALLEGED BY PETITIONER ARE NOT RIPE FOR REVIEW. 
Legal claims must be ripe for review in order for justiciability to exist. Tbe ripeness test in 
Idaho "asks whether court action is necessmy at the present time." Boundary Backftackers; 128 
Idaho 371, 376. Under the three-part ripeness analysis established by Idaho courts, a party must 
show the following: (1) The case presents definite and concrete issues; (2) a real and substantial 
controversy exists (as opposed to hypothetical facts); and (3) there is a present need for 
adjudication. Noh v. Cenarussa, 137 Idaho 798,801, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002). 
Idaho courts have applied the ripeness test to determine justiciability in a variety of cases. 
In Boundary County, the Supreme Court analyzed the constiturionality of an ordinance requiring 
Boundary County to enforce compliance with a plan proclauni.'1g that no wilderness areas shall 
be designated in Boundary Cmmty. The Court found the matter ripe for review since: 
The ordinance is in place. It contains several edicts concerning the 
compliance of federal and state agencies with the plan and 
announces that "[n]o wilderness areas shall be designated in 
Boundary County.!! The ordinance proclaims: "Bou.ridary County 
shall enforce complia.11ce with [the plan]. ... " The affidavit of the 
board members who enacted the ordinance stating that they 
"deemed that it would not be proper to seek enforcement of the 
ordinance by fines or penalties'' does not override the terms of the 
ordinance requiring enforcement. We w:ill not speculate whether 
the board members will choose another form of enforcement or 
whether a new board will choose to enforce the ordinance by fines 
or penalties. The ordinance requires the pla.'1 to be enforced. 
Boundary Backpackers, 128 Idaho 371; 376. 
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In Boundary, the Court found the matter ripe for review since the issue regarding the present 
ordinance was definite and a substantial controversy regarding enforcement existed, and 
there was a present need for adjudication. Id. 
In Slate v. Manley, the Idaho Supreme Court found fUl issue regarding the double 
jeopardy clause ripe for review. The case involved Manley's request for review of a District 
Court's declaration of a mistrial, and denial of Manley's Motion to Dismiss with prejudice on the 
grounds that any re-trial would be barred by double jeopardy. The State requested dismissal without 
prejudice, moving to dismiss the charge against Manley, but preserve the right to re-charge at a later 
date. The District Court grar1ted the State's Morion. 
The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court decision; and on appeal to the Supreme 
Court, the State argued that since Manley was no longer being charged, fae double jeopardy issue 
was not ripe for review. Tne Supreme found, "it is clear that this issue will be before us 
either now or in the future, and a declaration now of the various righrs of the pruties will 
certainly afford a relief from uncertainty and controversy in the future." State v. Manley, 142 
Idaho 338, 342, 127 P.~d 954 (Idaho 2005). 
In reaching its decision, the Court found that potential further prosecution of Manley was 
a concrete issue, and created a real and substantial controversy. The Court also found a present 
need for adjudication because Ma..'lley's double jeopardy rights had been violated. Id. Because 
Manley satisfied the three-part ripeness test, the Court found the issue ripe for review. 
Unlike the issue presented in Boundary Backpackers, where the constitutionality of an 
effective ordinance was in question, the adjudication of a fully executed and performed voluntary 
agreement does not present a definite a.rid concrete issue. In fact, arguments raised by the NEA 
fail to produce any issue at all, since the voluntary Addendum Contracts were a one-time 
measure, employed to address inLmediate and substantial financial concerns. Moreover, since the 
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voluntary Addendum Contracts been folly executed and performed, no definite and 
concrete issue exists. 
For the reasons mentioned above, the NBA cannot show a real an.d substantial 
controversy as required by factor two. There is no controversy with regard to the voluntary 
Addendum Contracts since by the time this Motion is heard, the voluntary Addend1.nn Contracts 
will have been fully performed. In seeking a declaratory judgment, the NEA's Petition only 
presents hypothetical facts, and will ask the Court to make an advisory opinion as to future 
adjudication of an executed voluntary agreement. 
Factor two distinctly requires a real and substantial comroversy to exist (as opposed to 
hypothetical facts). The NEA's request for a declaratory judgment in relation to a fully 
perfonned voluntary Addendum Contract compels the Court to consider purely hypothetical 
facts. As a result, the NEA fails to meet factor two of the ripeness analysis. 
Because the NEA fails to meet the first two prongs of the three-part ripeness test, and 
particularly since the voluntary Addendum Connacts have been executed and fully performed, 
the Court is not compelled to adjudicate the issue. In contrast to Manley, where a Constitutional 
right was at issue, and demanded present adjudication) the issue invoked in the NEA's Petition 
was the execution of a volm1tary agreement. This does not give rise to the violation of a 
constitutional right. Timsi the NEA fa.ils to meet the third factor of the ripeness analysis since 
there is no compelling need for present adjudication. 
As a result, court action is not necessary at the present time. Any issue raised by 
Petitioner in relation to the voluntary Addendum Contracts fails to meet the requirements for 
ripeness. Therefore, summary judgmem should enter in favor of the District. 
D. SINCE THE ISSUE IS NOT JUSTICIABLE AND NO ACTUAL CONTROVERSY 
EXISTS, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IS JMPROPER. 
The authority for Idaho courts to render declaratory judgment is provided by statute. The 
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Declaratory Judgment Act, contained in Idaho Code Title 10, Chapter 12, provides jurisdiction to 
the court to, "declare rights, status, 
be claimed." LC. § 10-1201. 
0th.er legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could 
However, absentjusticiability, Idaho courts may not grant declaratory relief. /.u1 early Idaho 
case provided, "a central fouI1dation of the Idaho Declaratory Judgment Act is the requirement of 
adverse parties, and there must be a justiciable issue presented." Whitney v. Randall, 58 Idaho 
49,59, 70 P.2d 384 (1937). 
More recently, the IdaJ10 Supreme Court recognized the limitations on jurisdiction to 
provide declaratory reliet rnling that "a declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a case 
where an actual or justiciable conrroversy exists." Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516, 
681 P.2d 988,991 (1984). 
In Harris; the appellants were recipients of county indigency benefits. The Court found 
justiciabiliry to exist since appellants did not pose a hypothetical question, and the controversy 
related to appellants' claim of right to receive county indigency benefits, even if the fund is 
depleted, was definite. concrete and touching the legal relations of the parties. The Court further 
found the parties to have adverse legal interests, and existence of a real and subs1antia1 
controversy since a claim of right to receive indigency benefits was at issue. Accordingly, the 
Court found the dismissal of the District Court's action for declaratory relief improper and 
remanded for further consideration. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court followed established Idaho precedent in Selkirk-Priest Basin 
Assoc., Inc. v. State ex rel. Batt, and ruled, "the Declaratory Judgment Act does not relieve a 
party from showing that it has standing to bring the action in the firsI instan.ce." Selkirk-Priest 
Basin Assoc., Inc. v. State ex rel. Bau, 128 Idaho 831, 834, 919 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1996). In 
Selkirk, the Court found that the Selkirk-Priest Basin Association's ("SPBA") right to challenge 
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timber sales Vlas directly impacted by existing statutes. However, since the SPBA failed to prove 
standing to challenge the timber sale in the first instance, the Court refused to grant the SPBA's 
request for declaratory judgment. See Selkirk-Priest Basin, 128 Idaho 831 (1996). 
Thus, it is well-established that Idaho Courts do not render declaratory judgment if the 
requirements of justiciability are not met. The NEA has failed to present a justiciable issue to the 
Court. Unlike Harris, where the Court found a real and substantial controversy, involving 
indigent citizen's future claims to the County indigent fund, the NEA seeks declaratory relief in 
relation to a fully perfo1med voluntary Addendum Contract. Therefr.)re, unlike Harris, the NEA' s 
Petition does not present a real or substrmtial controversy to the Court. 
The NEA's Petition compels the Court to consider the Idaho Supreme Comt's holding in 
Selkirk, where absent standing, the Court mled declaratory relief was improper. The NEA has 
failed to meet the standing requirements to request relief from the Court, just like the petitioners 
in Selkirk. As a result, the Court should not gra.rit injunctive relief 
The NEA/s failure to prove justiciability, leaves the Court \Vith no basis to grant 
Declaratory Judgment. Therefore, smnma.ry judgment should be entered in favor of the District 
CONCLUSION Ai°''D REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Respondent respectfully requests that this Court grant fae Motion for Summary Judgment 
based on the foregoing. Additionally, Respondent hereby requests that it be awarded its attorney 
fees and costs incurred herein pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-117 and 12-121 and Rule 
54(e)(l), IRCP. 
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DATED this 5th day of Ju...t1e, 2013. 
YOST LAW, PLLC 
By:_--=...-Y--______ _ 
Chip Giles 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of June, 2013, I caused to be served by the method 
indicated below a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon: 
Paul J. Stark 
Idaho Education Association 
620 North 6th St 
PO Box2638 
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Clµp Gjles 
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ADDENDUM TO 
CONTINUING TEACHER CONTRACT 
THIS ADDENDUM TO CONTfrJUlNG TEACHER CONTRACT ("Addendum") is 
made this 13 day of De?. , 201:).... by and betw.een NAMPA SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 131, Canyon County, Idaho, State of Idaho {hereinafter called "District") and 
...__ ___ (hereinafter,called "Teacher"), collectively referred to as 
RECITALS 
A. District and Teacher entered into a State of Idaho Continuing Teacher Contract 
dated the __ day of Se11:t: , 2012, for the school year 2012-2013. ,~ 
B. District is experiencing significant budgeting problems and will not be able to 
fully fund the cash flow requirements for the balance of the 2012-2013 school year. 
C. Teacher desires to pa."iicipate in a voluntary program to aid District in managing 
its necessary cash flow re<Juirements and enable District to meet its required and necessary 
obligations. · 
D. Now, therefore, the parties covenant and agree as follows. 
ADDENDUM 
L INCORPORATION OF RECITALS: The above recitals are contractual and 
binding and are incorporated herein as if set forth in foll. 
2. FURLOUGH DAYS: Teacher agrees to contribute ont; {l) to four ,(4) furlough 
clays to District from the following eligible dares (the selected furlough days shall be circled): .. , 
A furlough day is defmed as a voluntary act by Teacher iri accepting certain days where Teacher 
will not perform his or her customary duties and will receive no compensation for those days. At 
the complete discretion of Teacher, he/she may provide services as required under the 
Continuing Teacher Contract referred to above in Recital A1 but as a volunteer only. 
3. BENEFITS: No reduction will be made to any benefits available or accruing for 
and on behalf of Teacher. 
ADDENDUM TO CONTINUING TEACHER CONTRACT - I 
EXHIBIT .iJ'~ .. 
('. ( 
4. TERM: This Addendum shall apply only to the remainder of the 2012-2013 
school year, and this Addendum shall tenninate upon the termination date of the Continuing 
Teacher Contract referred to above in Recital A . . 
,, 
, 5. NO OTHER AMENDMENTS: It is agreed by and between the parties that 
nothing herein contained shall operate or be construed as a waiver of any of the rights, powers, 
privileges, or duties of either party hereto, by and under the laws of the State of Idaho, and as 
provided in that Continuing Teacher Contract referred to in Recital A, otherwise than is 
expressly stated_in this Add~ndum. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, District has caused this Addendum to be executed in its name 
by its proper officials, and Teacher has executed the same all on the date first above written. 
ATTEST: 
Clerk, Board of Trustees 
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRlCTNO. 131 
Canyon County, Idaho 
By:. __________ _ 
· Chafrman, Board of Trnstees 
PrintName: 
{:· 
•.:"~ . ~ . -~ 
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- , ___ ._. .._ U..,J..L 
- - - - _....,,, ,' ............ '-< 
William F. Yost, ISB No. 1242 
Chip Giles, No. 9135 
Yost Law, PLLC 
4 Ogden A venue 
PO Box 1275 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Telephone: 208-466-9222 
Facsimile: 208-466-1981 
Attorneys for Respondent 
~ f~ o I .A.~. E 
JUN 0 5 2013 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTR1CT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 13 L 
Respondent. 
) 








AFFIDAVIT OF STEVE KIPP IN 





County of Canyon ) 
STEVE KIPP, being first duly sworn, on oath. deposes and says: 
1. I was the Human Resource Officer of Nampa School District No. 131 (''District") 
at all times material to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed herewith. 
2. As the Human Resource Officer of the District, I was informed regarding the 
volW1tary furlough day agreements between the teachers and the District. 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVE KIPP IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGME:r-.'T - l 
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3. I coordinated the presentation process of the agreements from administration to 
teachers and personnel. 
4. At the conclusion of meetings between the District administration, teachers and 
staff, approximately 545 staff members ( approximately 501 certified teachers and approximately 
44 administrative staff) volunteered one or more furlough days. After the agreements were 
executed, approximately 24 certified: teachers later modified their agreements, either adding to or 
reducing the number of volunteer furlough days. 
Further the affiant sayeth naught 
STEVE KIPP ' ,,,1 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this go'f-'\day,o(May, 2013. 
. . ' . ., . _. ' ~-
commission expires: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of June, 2013, I caused to be served by the method 
indicated below a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon: 
Paul J. Stark 
Idaho Education Association 
620 North 6th St 
POBox2638 
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Chip G~les 
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Paul J. Stark, Esq. - ISB# 5919 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
620 North Sixth Street 
P.O. Box 2638 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 333-8560 
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 






NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
Case No.: CV13-2962-C 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Petitioner Nampa Education Association, by and through its attorney of record, Paul J. 
Stark, Esq., General Counsel, Idaho Education Association, hereby moves for an Order from tl\is 
Court granting summary judgment on its entire Petition for Declaratory Judgment on the grounds 
that the "Addendum Contracts" violated Idaho Code §33-513(1) because the "Addendum 
Contracts" were not a written contract approved by the state superintendent of public instruction, 
and therefore were illegal as a matter oflaw. 
Petitioner's Motion is supported by the Affidavit of Mandy Simpson in Support of 
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, with exhibits attached and Petitioner's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
000039 
<+'-
DATED this~ day of July, 2013. 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
ey for Plaintiff Nampa Education Association 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
,..,.,.-fL"-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~-- day of July, 2013, I caused a true and correct 






William F. "Bud" Yost 
Yost Law, PLLC 
4 Ogden A venue 
P.O. Box 1275 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Facsimile: (208) 466-1981 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
Paul J. Stark, Esq.- ISB #5919 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
620 North Sixth Street 
P.O. Box 2638 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 333-8560 
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 






NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
Case No.: CV13-2962-C 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Respondent Nampa School District No. 131 ("School District") issued Nampa School 
District teachers ("Teachers") illegal addendum contracts in violation of Idaho Code §33-513(1 ). 
Due to the fact that the addendum contracts modified the terms and conditions of employment 
(as contained in the Standard Teacher Contract) and were not a written contract approved by the 
state superintendent of public instruction, such addendums were illegal as a matter of statutory 
and regulatory law. 
Petitioner Nampa Education Association ("Petitioner") is the duly selected and 
recognized representative for the teachers in the School District. As discussed below, Petitioner 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
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is entitled to summary judgment against the School District because, as a matter of law, the 
addendum contracts are unlawful and unenforceable. Further, Petitioner is entitled an award of 
attorney's fees and costs, and for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and 
equitable. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the summer of 2012, the Teachers signed a Standard Teacher Contract on a form 
approved by the state superintendent of public instruction for the 2012-2013 school year. 
Affidavit of Mandy Simpson ("Simpson Aff.") ~ 5. The Standard Teacher Contract established 
the terms and conditions of the Teachers' employment for the 2012-2013 school year. 
The Standard Teacher Contract form approved by the state superintendent of public 
instruction, and signed by the Teachers, provided: 
It is understood and agreed between the parties that this Contract is subject to the 
applicable laws of the State of Idaho, the duly adopted rules of the State Board of 
Education and the policies of the District which are, by reference, incorporated 
herein and made a part of this agreement the same as if fully set forth herein. 
Simpson Aff. Exhibit A. 
On or about the week of December 10, 2012, the School District began a systematic plan 
where Teachers working for the School District were required to attend mandatory "emergency" 
meetings conducted by the Teachers' immediate supervisory, often the teachers' building 
principal. Simpson Aff. ~ 7. At those meetings, teachers were pressured by the School District 
to modify the terms of their Standard Teachers Contract by signing another contract for 
employment entitled "Addendum Contract." Simpson Aff. ~ 10. 
The "Addendum Contracts," if signed, were an agreement to take four (4) unpaid 
furlough days between January and May, 2013. Simpson Aff. Exhibit B. The School District 
required that these addendum contracts be signed and returned no later than Monday, December 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
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17, 2012. Simpson Aff. ,r 9. The decision to put forward these addendum contracts, however, 
was never actually approved by the Board of Trustees for the School District. Simpson Aff. ,r,r 
11-12. 
On December 14, 2012, the Teachers wrote a letter to the Superintendent of the School 
District objecting on the basis that the addendum contracts violated Idaho Code §33-513(1) 
because the addendum contracts were not a written contract approved by the state superintendent 
of public instruction. Simpson Aff. ,r 13, Exhibit C. On December 18, 2012, the Teachers again 
wrote the School District objecting to the addendum contracts with the additional basis that the 
addendum contracts violated the Rules of the Idaho State Department of Education (IDAP A 
08.02.01.150). Simpson Aff. ,r 15, Exhibit D. The School District, however, continued to 
pressure and enforce the addendum contracts in violation of Idaho law. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The Addendum Contracts Given to Teachers in December 2012 Were Not On a 
Form Approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and Therefore 
Are, as a Matter of Law, Illegal. 
The Addendum contracts that were presented to the Teachers were not on a form 
approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction as required by statutory law, 
administrative rule and Idaho Supreme Court case law. As a result, the Addendum contracts, as 
a matter oflaw, are illegal and unenforceable. 
Teacher contracts in Idaho are limited. They are limited to an approved form. A 
teacher's terms and conditions of employment are contained on what is commonly referred to as 
the "Standard Teacher Contract." Such "Standard Teacher Contracts" are published annually by 
the Idaho State Department of Education 011 their website at 
http://www.sde.idaho.gov/site/educator resources/contracts.htm. The standard contracts include 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-3 
4 
contracts for administrators, Category 1, 2, 3 and renewable contract teachers, as well as retired 
teachers contracts and supplemental contracts. The Standard Teacher Contract itself contains the 
following legend at the bottom of the contract: 
This contract form was prepared pursuant to Section 33-513, Idaho Code, and 
approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, as a contract which 
may be used by school districts. Any other form must be approved by the State 
Superintendent, and reviewed for reapproval every three years. 
Simpson Aff. Exhibit A. 
Idaho statutory law, as well as administrative rule, is plain and unambiguous in the 
requirement that teachers are employed only on the contracts approved by the state 
superintendent of public instruction (i.e., the Standard Teacher Contract). Idaho Code § 33-513 
provided, in relevant part, that the board of trustees1 shall have very limited authority in its 
choice of contract for employment of a teacher. In fact, a school district has absolutely no 
choice: 
The board of trustees of each school district including any specially chartered 
district, shall have the following powers and duties: 
1. To employ professional personnel, on written contract in a form approved 
by the state superintendent of public instruction, conditioned upon a valid 
certificate being held by such professional personnel at the time of entering upon 
the duties thereunder. 
(Emphasis added.)2 Further, the rules of the Idaho State Board of Education specifically prohibit 
any deviation from the form approved by the state superintendent of public instruction. IDAP A 
08.02.01 .150 provides: 
1 There is nothing in the published minutes of the School District demonstrating that the Nampa Board of Trustees 
voted to authorize the use of the addendum contracts in the first place. Simpson Aff. ,i 12. 
2 The phrases "professional personnel" and "professional employee are used interchangeable in the statutes. See 
e.g. Idaho Code §33-515(5). "Professional personnel" is not defined, but "professional employee" is defined under 
Idaho Code §33-1272(1). 
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DEVIATION FROM STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FORM. 
The State Superintendent of Public Instruction has approved a standard 
employment contract form. Any deviation from this contract form must be 
approved bv the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and reviewed for 
reapproval once every three (3) years. (Section 33-513, Idaho Code) 
IDAPA 08.02.01.150. (Emphasis added.) 
Idaho statutory law pertaining to teachers is incorporated in each individual teacher's 
Teachers' Standard Contract. Brown v. Caldwell School District No. 132, 127 Idaho 112, 118, 
898 P.2d 43, 49 (1995); Robinson v. Joint School District No. 150, 100 Idaho 263,265, 596 P.2d 
436,438 (1979). The Court, in interpreting a similar education code provision, has also held that 
the word "shall" is imperative or mandatory, Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848, 908 P.2d 143, 
150 (1995). Properly promulgated administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect 
of law. Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687,690,604 P.2d 51, 54 (1979), cited in Mead v. 
Arnell, 117 Idaho 660,665, 791 P.2d 410,415 (1990). 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to 
the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 
654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 
(Ct.App.2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational 
meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and unambiguous, 
there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory 
interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. 
Here there is no ambiguity whatsoever. The law is very clear that a teacher must be 
employed pursuant to the approved Standard Teacher Contract, and no other. The School 
District has no option to deviate from the Standard Teacher Contract. There is no evidence that 
the state superintendent of public instruction approved the School District's addendum contracts, 
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nor is there any approval of a deviation from the Standard Teacher Contract. A school district is 
not permitted to "go rogue" with its teacher contracts, and these addendum contracts are simply 
outside of what the statute and rule allow. 
Indeed, if such addendum contracts were somehow permissible, it would eviscerate the 
existence of the Standard Teacher Contract. A teacher could conceivably sign a Standard 
Teacher Contract, and then sign an addendum contract the very next day changing any or all of 
the terms in the Standard Teacher Contract. In such instance, the statute and rule would be 
rendered entirely superfluous. "It is incumbent upon [the] Court to interpret a statute in a 
manner that will not nullify it and it is not to be presumed that the legislature performed an idle 
act of enacting a superfluous statute." Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572, 798 P .2d 27, 31 
(1990). It is clear, however, from the language of both Idaho Code §33-513(1) and IDAP A 
08.02.01.150 that the intent of the state legislature was to have a single, state-wide approved 
form to be a standardized contract for all Idaho teachers and no other. 
This conclusion is further supported by the Idaho Supreme Court holding in Rhoades v. 
Idaho Falls School Dist. No. 91, 131 Idaho 827, 965 P.2d 187 (1998). In Rhoades, the teacher 
was not granted a contract for the subsequent year based upon documents that were not part of 
the Standard Teacher's Contract. Specifically, the teacher in Rhoades, much like the teachers in 
this case, signed a document that was prepared by the school district and was separate and apart 
from the Standard Teacher's Contract. Id. at 828, 965 P.2d at 188. The Idaho Supreme Court 
squarely held that any document other than the Standard Teacher Contract was "ineffective" and 
could not change a teacher rights. The Court held: 
LC. § 33-513(1) authorizes the board to employ professional personnel "on 
written contract in form approved by the state superintendent of public 
instruction." The contract signed by the teacher and the chair of the board for the 
1992-93 school year bears a legend that it was prepared pursuant to LC.§ 33-513 
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and that any other form of contract must be approved by the State Board of 
Education. There is no evidence that the other documents on which the 
district relies to remove the protections of the statutes and the master 
contract were approved bv the State Superintendent of Public Instruction or 
the State Board of Education. Therefore, they were ineffective to change the 
rights the teacher had under the statutes and the master contract. 
Id. at 830, 965 P.2d 190 (emphasis added). Certainly, a teacher is entitled to his or her 
statutory rights to have the terms and conditions of employment on the Standard Teacher 
Contract. Such statutory rights are incorporated into the Standard Teacher Contract itself. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner is entitled to summary judgment on their Petition for 
Declaratory Judgment because Idaho Code, the administrative rule of the State Board of 
Education, and Idaho case law all limit a school district's ability to employ a teacher to the 
Standard Teacher Contract approved by the state superintendent of public instruction. To hold 
otherwise would nullify the law. Petitioner is likewise entitled to attorney fees and costs, and 
such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
-t<A 
DATED this .i_ day of July, 2013. 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
By: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-~ I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theb day of July, 2013, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S 





William F. "Bud" Yost 
Yost Law, PLLC 
4 Ogden A venue 
P.O. Box 1275 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Facsimile: (208) 466-1981 
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Paul J. Stark, Esq.- ISB# 5919 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
620 North Sixth Street 
P.O. Box 2638 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 333-8560 
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 






NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
ST A TE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
Case No.: CV13-2962-C 
AFFIDAVIT OF MANDY SIMPSON 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
I, MANDY SIMPSON, having been duly sworn, depose and say as follows: 
1. I am the President of the Nampa Education Association, Petitioner in this action. 
2. The Nampa Education Association was duly chosen as the representative organization of 
the teachers within the Nampa School District for the 2012-2013 school year. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MANDY SIMPSON IN SUPPORT OF 
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3. The Nampa Education Association was recognized by the Nampa School District as the 
representative organization of the teachers within the Nampa School District for the 
2012-2013 school year. 
4. The Nampa Education Association has been duly chosen and recognized as the 
representative organization of the teachers within the Nampa School District for the past 
several decades. 
5. That in September of 2012, teachers within the Nampa School District signed a Standard 
Teacher Contract for the 2012-2013 school year, as teachers have for decades. 
6. Attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by this reference are true and correct copies of 
the form Standard Teacher Contract (both continuing and category A contracts) offered 
by the Nampa School District for the 2012-2013 school year. 
7. On or about the week of December 10, 2012, the Nampa School District began pressuring 
teachers to sign an addendum contract by requiring teachers to attend mandatory 
"emergency" meetings where the addendum contract was presented. 
8. Attached as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct copy of 
the form addendum contract (for both continuing and category A contracts). 
9. Many teachers were told that the addendum contracts had to be signed and returned 
within a matter of a few days (December 1 ih). 
10. Many teachers felt pressured to sign the addendum contracts by the Nampa School 
District and did not consider it voluntary. These teachers expressed fear of retaliation 
should they not sign the addendum contracts or if they were to publically state that the 
contracts were not voluntarily signed. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MANDY SIMPSON IN SUPPORT OF 
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11. I personally attended all of the Nampa School Board of Trustees meetings in the fall of 
2012, testifying to the School Board on multiple dates, and the Nampa School Board of 
Trustees itself never voted in open session as to the decision to put forward the addendum 
contracts. 
12. I have researched the archived minutes of the Nampa School Board of Trustees and have 
not found any evidence that the Nampa School Board of Trustees ever voted on whether 
to put forward addendum contracts to the teachers of the Nampa School District. 
13. During the week of December 10, 2012, where teachers were being pressured to sign the 
addendum contracts, I directed legal counsel to draft a letter to the Nampa School District 
explaining the situation. 
14. Attached as Exhibit "C" and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct copy of a 
December 14, 2012 letter from Paul Stark to Dr. Thomas Michaelson, Superintendent of 
the Nampa School District. 
15. As the high pressure tactics continued, I again directed legal counsel to draft a second 
letter to the Nampa School District explaining the situation 
16. Attached as Exhibit "D" and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct copy of a 
December 18, 2012 letter from Paul Stark to Dr. Thomas Michaelson, Superintendent of 
the Nampa School District. 
17. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth in this Affidavit and, if called as a 
witness, could and would truthfully and competently testify to such matters. 
DATED this~ day of July, 2013, at the City of Nampa, County of Canyon, State of Idaho. 
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~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this~ day of July, 2013. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MANDY SIMPSON IN SUPPORT OF 
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SDE Approved 4/29/20 I l 
STATE OF IDAHO 
CONTINUING TEACHERS CONTRACT 
THIS CONTRACT, made this 151h day of August year of 2012, by and between Nampa School District No. 131, Nampa, 
Idaho ("the District"), and «First Name» «Last Name» ("the Teacher"). 
WITNESSETH: 
1. The District hereby employs the Teacher pursuant to Section 33-515, Idaho Code, for the duration of the 2012-2013 
school year, consisting of a period of «Position Days» days, and agrees to pay the Teacher for said services a base sum 
of «Amount in Words» ($«Amount») of which 1/12lh shall be payable on the 251h day(s) of the months September year 
of 2012 to August year of 2013 inclusive, and such other monetary benefits as accorded to its certificated employees by 
the District. 
2. Teaching assignment(s): «Description» - (Col «Col Head», Step «Row Head») 
and such other duties as may be assigned by the District for which the Teacher is properly certified and endorsed. 
3. The Teacher agrees to perform all teaching assignments made by the District in accordance with the highest professional 
standards and to have and maintain the legal qualifications required to teach in the aforesaid grades or subjects during all 
times that performance is required hereunder. 
4. It is understood and agreed between the parties that this Contract is subject to the applicable laws of the State of Idaho, 
the duly adopted rules of the State Board of Education and the policies of the District which are, by reference, 
incorporated herein and made a part of this agreement the same as if fully set forth herein. 
5. Any material false statement knowingly made in the written application for a position with the District shall constitute 
sufficient ground for voiding this Contract. 
6. The District Board of Trustees may terminate or reduce the full-time equivalency status of this contract upon conclusion 
of the school year stated in Section 1 of this contract, without owing any further compensation, in the event that the 
Board institutes a reduction in force pursuant to Section 33-522, Idaho Code, resulting in the termination or reduction of 
the employment relationship between the District and the Teacher. 
7. It is mutually understood and agreed by and between the parties that nothing herein contained shall operate or be 
construed as a waiver of any of the rights, powers, privileges, or duties of either party hereto, by and under the laws of 
the State of Idaho, except as expressly stated in this Contract. 
8. The terms of this Contract shall be subject to amendment and adjustment to conform to the terms of either a Master 
Contract or the compensation established the Board of Trustees pursuant to Section 33-1274, Idaho Code, as such terms 
are applicable for the same school year as this Contract. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the District has caused this Contract to be executed in its name by its proper officials and the 
Teacher has executed the same all on the date first above written. 
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.131 CANYON COUNTY(IES) STATE OF IDAHO 
TEACHER 
By --'~"'"""'_,.tt-___ _._HJ--..#~~·--.l-=--'"'---' CHAIRMAN 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
Attest: -+).;<_-+-''---'-A_,_ ..._2J7}bl-'-"'---'--'--"'-c-..,__.--='--------
~RINTENDENT OR CLERK 
BXHlBIT A 
This contract form was prepared pursuant to Section 33-513, Idaho Code, and approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, as a contract 
which may be used by school districts. Any other form must be approved by the State Superintendent, and reviewed for reapproval every three years. 
«DAC» 
SDE Approved 4/29/2011 
STATE OF IDAHO 
CATEGORY A TEACHERS CONTRACT 
THIS CONTRACT, made this 15th day of August, year of 2012, by and between Nampa School District No. 131, Nampa, Idaho 
("the District"), and «First Name» «Last Name» ("the Teacher"). 
WITNESSETH: 
1. The District hereby employs the Teacher pursuant to Section 33-514(2)(a), Idaho Code, for the duration of the 2012-2013 school 
year, consisting of a period of «Position Days» days, and agrees to pay the Teacher for said services a base sum of 
«Amount in Words» ($«Amount») of which 1112th shall be payable on the 2Slb day(s) of the months September year of 2012 to 
August year of 2013 inclusive, and such other monetary benefits as accorded to its certificated employees by the District. 
2. Teaching assignment(s): «Description» - (Col «Col Head» Step «Row Head») 
and such other duties as may be assigned by the District for which the Teacher is properly certified and endorsed. 
3. The Teacher agrees to perform all teaching assignments made by the District in accordance with the highest professional 
standards and to have and maintain the legal qualifications required to teach in the aforesaid grades or subjects during all times 
that performance is required hereunder. 
4. It is understood and agreed between the parties that this Contract is subject to the applicable laws of the State of Idaho, the duly 
adopted rules of the State Board of Education and the policies of the District which are, by reference, incorporated herein and 
made a part of this Contract the same as if fully set forth herein, and that no property rights attach to this Contract beyond the 
term of this Contract. 
5. Any material false statement knowingly made in the written application for a position with the District shall constitute 
sufficient ground for voiding this Contract. 
6. It is mutually understood and agreed by and between the parties that nothing herein contained shall operate or be construed as a 
waiver of any of the rights, powers, privileges, or duties of either party hereto, by and under the laws of the State of Idaho, 
except as expressly stated in this agreement. 
7. The terms of this Contract shall be subject to amendment and adjustment to conform to the terms of either a Master Contract or 
the compensation established the Board of Trustees pursuant to Section 33-1274, Idaho Code, as such terms are applicable for 
the same school year as this Contract. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the District has caused this Contract to be executed in its name by its proper officials and the Teacher has 
executed the same all on the date first above written. 
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.131 
TEACHER 
CANYON COUNTY(IES) STATE OF IDAHO 
By --~._,.,-.tl::......__._H___.~~·J..o~"'---' CHAIRMAN 
BOARDOF TRUSTEES 
Attest: _ ___. k~ A__,_,. 2rlJW ......... ~~C--,......~~=====.:::----
c::Jst;;tRINTENDENT OR CLERK 
This contract form was prepared pursuant to Section 33-513, Idaho Code, and approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, as a contract which may be 




CONTINUING TEACHER CONTRACT 
THIS ADDENDUM TO CONTINUING TEACHER CONTRACT ("Addendum") is 
made this __ day of _______ , 201_, by and between NAMPA SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 131, Canyon County, Idaho, State of Idaho (hereinafter called "District") and 





District and Teacher entered into a State of Idaho Continuing Teacher Contract 
day of _______ , 2012, for the school year 2012-2013. 
B. District is experiencing significant budgeting problems and will not be able to 
fully fund the cash flow requirements for the balance of the 2012-2013 school year. 
C. Teacher desires to participate in a voluntary program to aid District in managing 
its necessary cash flow requirements and enable District to meet its required and necessary 
obligations. 
D. Now, therefore, the parties covenant and agree as follows. 
ADDENDUM 
1. INCORPORATION OF RECITALS: The above recitals are contractual and 
binding and are incorporated herein as if set forth in full. 
2. FURLOUGH DAYS: Teacher agrees to contribute one (1) to four (4) furlough 
days to District from the following eligible dates (the selected furlough days shall be circled): 
• January 4, 2013 
• March 8, 2013 
• March 22, 2013 
• May 31, 2013. 
A furlough day is defined as a voluntary act by Teacher in accepting certain days where Teacher 
will not perform his or her customary duties and will receive no compensation for those days. At 
the complete discretion of Teacher, he/she may provide services as required under the 
Continuing Teacher Contract referred to above in Recital A, but as a volunteer only. 
3. BENEFITS: No reduction will be made to any benefits available or accruing for 
and on behalf of Teacher. 
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4. TERM: This Addendum shall apply only to the remainder of the 2012-2013 
school year, and this Addendum shall tenninate upon the termination date of the Continuing 
Teacher Contract referred to above in Recital A. 
5. NO OTHER AMENDMENTS: It is agreed by and between the parties that 
nothing herein contained shall operate or be construed as a waiver of any of the rights, powers, 
privileges, or duties of either party hereto, by and under the laws of the State of Idaho, and as 
provided in that Continuing Teacher Contract referred to in Recital A, otherwise than is 
expressly stated in this Addendum. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, District has caused this Addendum to be executed in its name 
by its proper officials, and Teacher has executed the same all on the date first above written. 
ATTEST: 
Clerk, Board of Trustees 
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131 
Canyon County, Idaho 
By: _____________ _ 
Chairman, Board of Trustees 
Signature of Teacher 
Print Name: -----------
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ADDENDUM TO 
CATEGORY A TEACHER CONTRACT 
THIS ADDENDUM TO CATEGORY A TEACHER CONTRACT ("Addendum") is 
made this __ day of _______ , 20 by and between NAMPA SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 131, Canyon County, Idaho, State of Idaho (hereinafter called "District") and 
______________ (hereinafter called "Teacher"), collectively referred to as 
the "parties." 
RECITALS 
A. District and Teacher entered into a State of Idaho Category A Teacher Contract 
dated the __ day of _______ , 2012, for the school year 2012-2013. 
B. District is experiencing significant budgeting problems and will not be able to 
fully fund the cash flow requirements for the balance of the 2012-2013 school year. 
C. Teacher desires to participate in a voluntary program to aid District in managing 
its necessary cash flow requirements and enable District to meet its required and necessary 
obligations. 
D. Now, therefore, the parties covenant and agree as follows. 
ADDENDUM 
1. INCORPORATION OF RECITALS: The above recitals are contractual and 
binding and are incorporated herein as if set forth in full. 
2. FURLOUGH DAYS: Teacher agrees to contribute one (1) to four (4) furlough 
days to District from the following eligible dates (the selected furlough days shall be circled): 
• January 4, 2013 
• March 8, 2013 
• March 22, 20 13 
• May 31, 2013. 
A furlough day is defined as a voluntary act by Teacher in accepting certain days where Teacher 
will not perform his or her customary duties and will receive no compensation for those days. At 
the complete discretion of Teacher, he/she may provide services as required under the Category 
A Teacher Contract referred to above in Recital A, but as a volunteer only. 
3. BENEFITS: No reduction will be made to any benefits available or accruing for 
and on behalf of Teacher. 
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4. TERM: This Addendum shall apply only to the remainder of the 2012-2013 
school year, and this Addendum shall terminate upon the termination date of the Category A 
Teacher Contract referred to above in Recital A. 
5. NO OTHER AMENDMENTS: It is agreed by and between the parties that 
nothing herein contained shall operate or be construed as a waiver of any of the rights, powers, 
privileges, or duties of either party hereto, by and under the laws of the State of Idaho, and as 
provided in that Category A Teacher Contract referred to in Recital A, otherwise than is 
expressly stated in this Addendum. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, District has caused this Addendum to be executed in its name 
by its proper officials, and Teacher has executed the same all on the date first above written. 
ATTEST: 
Clerk, Board of Trustees 
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131 
Canyon County, Idaho 
By: ---------------
Ch airman, Board of Trustees 
Signature of Teacher 
Print Name: -----------
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IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
P.O. BOX 2638, BOISE, IDAHO 83701-2638, 620 N. SIXTH STREET, 83702 
December 14, 2012 
VIA FACSIMILE & US MAIL 
Dr. Thomas Michaelson, Superintendent 
Nampa School District 
619 S. Canyon Street 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
Re: Illegal Addendum Contracts 
Dear Superintendent Michaelson: 
208/333-8560 
It has recently come to my attention that the Nampa School District is requiring teachers 
within the School District to attend mandatory meetings, and then pressuring those teachers to 
accept a change in terms and conditions of their employment.' The teachers in Nampa are 
certainly very concerned and invested in the welfare of the School District. These high pressure 
tactics, however, are not only improper, but also illegal. For reasons discussed below, I am 
writing to ask that these actions immediately cease and the School District comply with the clear 
requirements of the law. 
First, it is my understanding that the School District is requiring teachers to attend the 
mandatory, "emergency" meetings so that the School District can essentially pressure these 
educators into signing a contract labeled as an "Addendum" to the existing contracts. These 
meetings have been going on continually this week, and the School District has required that 
these "Addendums" be returned no later than Monday, December 17, 2012. It is unclear where 
this artificial deadline comes from. It is certainly not contained in Idaho law. What is more 
troubling is that by doing so, the School District has violated the provisions of Idaho Code §§33-
1271, et seq. and acted in violation of the good faith provisions of that act. See Gilbert v. 
Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 104 Idaho 137,657 P.2d 1 (1983). The conduct of the School 
District in these efforts amounts to illegal direct dealing, which is universally been held to be 
AFFlLIATEO wmt THE NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
000060 
Dr. Thotnas Michaelsen, Superintendent 
Nampa School District 
December 14, 2012 
Page - 2 
acting in bad faith. Naperville Ready Mix, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 242 F.3d 744 (2001). See also 
Intemational Ass'n of Firefighters, Local No. 672 v. City of Boise City, 136 Idaho 162, 30 P.3d 
940 (2001). 
With your recent employment in Idaho you may not recognize that Idaho Code §33-1271 
requires all negotiations regarding the terms and conditions of employment of certificated 
personnel be negotiated with the duly recognized local education organization. This has long 
been the relationship in Nampa. Indeed, the Nampa School District has recognized the Nampa 
Education Association as the lawful "local education organization" and has this very year 
negotiated with that organization. Idaho Code §33-1271 further requires both parties to negotiate 
in good faith. The recent and unprecedented actions of the School District, however, have 
seemingly ignored the clear requirements of the law. Indeed, it is noteworthy that neither you 
nor your administration has even once attempted to discuss the cmTent critical situation with 
Nampa Education Association President Ms. Mandy Simpson. Instead, you have chosen to 
dispense with the law and bargain directly with the teachers individually in an effort that can 
only be seen as an unsavory attempt to apply more pressure and intimidation. If it were not so, 
then please explain why you have made no effort to meet and discuss these matters with Ms. 
Simpson. This is clearly bad faith on the School District's part. 
I would also like to point out that these "Addendums" are, under both statutory and Idaho 
Supreme Court case law,per se illegal. Idaho Code §33-513(1) provides that the School Board 
has the power and duty: "To employ professional personnel, on written contract in form 
approved hv the state superintendent of public instruction, conditioned upon a valid certificate 
being held by such professional personnel at the time of entering upon the duties thereunder." 
(Emphasis added.) There is no indication that these "Addendum" forms have been so approved. 
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has unambiguously held that any documents not approved, as 
required by this statute, are "ineffective to change the rights the teacher had under the statutes 
and the master contract." Rhoades v. Idaho Falls School Dist. No. 91, 131 ldaho 827, 830, 965 
P.2d 187, 190 (1998). Therefore, these "Addendum" contracts that the Nampa teachers are being 
pressured into signing, as well as the administrator's version of the "Addendum," are illegal. 
Again, it is unprecedented for the Nampa School District to take such illegal actions. 
I need to also note that the teachers in Nampa are very concerned with the current 
situation that, as you know, is not of their making. The teachers are extremely concerned as to 
what effect the mismanagement by the former administration will have on the education of the 
children in Nampa School District. Certainly, this is not a situation anyone would wish to have 
occurred. That said, this crisis should not be taken as an opportunity to circumvent the law and 
its requirements. Further, l would encourage you to actually meet with the teachers' duly 
Dr. 'l1t0111as ivi ichaeison, Superimendem 
Nampa School District 
December 14, 2012 
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recognized representatives to collabomte on solutions, Unfortunately, as of the date of this 
correspondence, that has not occurred. 
cc: Mandy Simpson 







IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
P.O. BOX 2638, BOISE, IOAHO 83701-2638, 620 N. SIXTH STREET, 83702 
www.idahoea.org 
December 18, 2012 
VIA FACSIMILE & US. MAIL 
Dr. Thomas Michaelson, Superintendent 
Nampa School District 
619 S. Canyon Street 
Nampa, Idaho 83686 
Re: Addendum Contracts 
Dear Superintendent Michaelson: 
208/344-1341 
'-- FAX 208/336-6967 
I am unfortunately writing again regarding the Addendum contracts that teachers in the 
Nampa School District are being compelled to sign. I have spoken with numerous teachers 
within the School District and there is considerable pressure being applied and felt, to the point 
where most teachers feel as if they have no choice. Teachers are feeling that if they do not sign 
the Addendum contract that they will be subjected to adverse job action, retaliation and in some 
instances are actually having their administrator looking over the shoulder, telling them to sign 
the Addendum contract as it is being reviewed. Regardless of whether they are occurring under 
the school district's directive, the district has an obligation to stop these tactics. Again, I must 
renew my demand that the School District cease these activities. 
I must also reiterate that the contracts that are being presented by the School District are 
not on forms approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. See Idaho Code §33-
513(1 ). See also Rhoades v. Idaho Falls School Dist. No. 91, 131 Idaho 827, 830, 965 P.2d 
187, 190 (1998). Therefore, these contracts are illegal and unenforceable. Indeed, the Rules of 
the Idaho State Department of Education are explicit in this matter: 
DEVIATION FROM STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FORM. 
The State Superintendent of Public Instruction has approved a standard 
employment contract form. Any deviation from this contract form must be 
approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and reviewed for 
reapproval once every three (3) years. (Section 33-513, Idaho Code) 
IDAPA 08.02.01.150. (Emphasis added.) 
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In light of this, I am asking that you immediately direct your administration to cease all 
further activities in relation to these addendum contracts. Fmiher, I ask that you communicate 
with all the teachers in the Nampa School District informing them of these facts, and declaring 
that the Nampa School District will not attempt to enforce any addendum contracts that have 
already been signed, 
Please respond to this correspondence as soon as possible. I appreciate your attention to 
this most unfortunate turn of events. 
cc: Mandy Simpson 
Scott Kido, Board Chair 
Region Directors 
Sincerely, 
William F. Yost, ISB No. 1242 
Chip Giles, ISB No. 9135 
Yost Law, PLLC 
4 Ogden A venue 
PO Box 1275 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Telephone: 208-466-9222 
Facsimile: 208-466~1981 
Attorneys for Respondent 
F i A.k~.M. 
-- /4JL 1 2 20\3 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
c.oYE,DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, 
Respondent. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2013-2962-C 
) 
) RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR ) 





COMES NOW the Respondent, NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, ("Distrid') by 
and through its counsel of record, William F. Yost and Chip Giles, of Yost Law, PLLC, and replies 
to Petitioner's C'NEN'), Motion for Summary Judgment as follows: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Notwithstanding the District's position set forth in its Motion for Summary Judgment that 
based on lack of standing, the NEA's Petition is improper1 and no genuine issue as to any 
material fact exists, the District files the reply herein for the limited purposes of reiterating the 
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District's position on standing, to provide the Conrt with proper analysis regarding Idaho 
Code§ 33-513, and to address issues concerning the affidavit of Mandy Simpson. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The NEA lacks standing to bring the Petition, and likewise lacks standing to move for 
Summary Judgment. 
Under Idaho law, the NEA lacks standing to file the petition upon which this action is 
based. It follows that the NEA also lacks standing to move for Summary Judgment 
Idaho courts have ruled that in order to prove standing, "litigants generally must allege or 
demonstrate an iajmy in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will 
prevent or redress the claimed injury." Miles v. Idaho Power Comptmy, 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 
P.2d 757, 763 (1989). In Miles, the Court also held that standing requires a showing of a 
"distinct and palpable injury." Id. at 641. 
As a teachers union, the NEA has not, and cannot allege an injury in fact. Furthermore, 
the NEA ha.s failed to show a distinct and palpable injury. The process surrounding the 
addendum contracts was completely voluntary, and a completely voluntary act cannot produce a 
"distinct and palpable" injury. 
By way of relief, Petitioner requests the previously executed voluntary addendum 
contracts be declared unlawful or unenforceable. Such relief will do nothing to prevent or redress 
the injury claimed. The agreement to volunteer furlough days has been fully executed, and 
declaring the agreement's unlawful will not redress any perceived or claimed injury. This failure 
to prove redressability is an additional bar to the NEA's standing. Pursuant to Idaho law, the 
NEA has failed to establish standing to bring this petition, and therefore lacks standing to request 
summary judgment. 
Idaho courts have also addressed the issue of standing for associations ruling, "as applied 
to associations seeking standing for its members, this court considers whether the association has 
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alleged that at least one of its members faces injury and could meet the requirements of standing 
on an individual basis." 111. re Jerome County Bd of Comm'ts, 153 Idaho 298. 281 PJd 1076, 
1082 (2012). 
In re Jerome County, concerned several envirorunent?l groups petition for review of a 
decision ordered by the Jerome County Board of Comrnissioners. ·nie Idaho Supreme Court 
ruled that only groups with members whose primary residences were within one mile of the 
proposed site, or adjacent to the proposed site could be severely affected. The Court denied 
standing to other groups that did not have members living in close proximity to the proposed site. 
In summary, the Idaho Supreme Court refuses to grant standing to plaintiff's unless they have 
been, or could be harmed by an alleged action. 
Like the Plaintiffs denied standing in Jerome County, th.e NEA has failed to name any 
member directly harmed by the signing of the voluntary addendum contracts. In support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment the NEA attaches the Affidavit of Mandy Simpson ("Ms. 
Simpson"). Her Affidavit does not provide any facts or allegations that she was personally 
harmed by the signing of an addendum contract. She appears to rely on her position as president 
of the NEA to speak to the alleged harm of other members, even though she alleges no harm to 
herself Ms. Simpson has not; and could not have been harmed by the NEA's alleged actions, and 
she does not so state in her affidavit. The Idaho Supreme Court has refused to grant standing in 
similar situations lacking allegations of potential or present ha.rm. 
Since Ms. Simpson's Affidavit fails to allege a personal harm, and in the absence of any 
NEA members allegation of harm, the NEA fails to meet the Idaho requirements for 
associational standing. Therefore, under the associational standing analysis, the NEA lacks 
standing to bring this Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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B. Petitioner's argument that the addendum contracts are as a matter of law illegal is not 
supported by Idaho Statue or case law. 
The NEA argues that since the voluntary contracts presented to teachers as a one-time 
measure to address a financial crisis faced by the District were not on a form approved by the 
state superintendent of public education, the contracts are as a matter of law illegal and 
unenforceable. The NEA relies on Idaho Code § 33-513 which provides: 
The board of trustees of each school district including any 
specifically chartered district, shall have the following powers and 
duties: 
1. To employ professional personnel, on written contract in a 
form approved by the state superintendent of public instruction, 
conditioned upon a valid certificate being held by such 
professional personnel at the· time of entering upon the duties 
thereunder. (Emphasis added). 
The foregoing statute applies to employment contracts, otherwise known as a standard 
teacher contract or ''master contract." The contracts in this case were voluntary agreements with 
teacher's for furlough days, not employment contracts pursuant to LC. § 33-513. The NEA has 
failed to provide any authority wJ:ijch would subject the voluntary agreement signed by Nampa 
teachers to the purview ofldaho Code 33-513. 
The only authority cited by the NEA in an attempt w apply I.C. § 33-513 to the voluntary 
addendum contracts is Rhoades v. Idaho Falls School Dist. No. 91. The facts in Rhodes should 
be considered by the Court In Rhoades a teacher signed a stmdard teacher contract describing 
her salary as "Adjusted Base Salary for 190 days, 50 percent of teaching day --$10,158.00." The 
chair of the district's board of trustees signed the contract on behalf of the district. The contract 
also provided "this contract is for one year only and is non-renewable. While you will be given 
consideration for any openings that may occur for the 1993-94 school year, you will need to re-
apply through the regular application process." Rhoades v. Idaho Falls School Dist. No. 91 131 
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Idaho 827, 965 P.2d 187 (Idaho 1998). The District's reduction in force policy was also attached 
to the contract. Id. 
The teacher in Rhodes fulfilled her obligations under the contract; and on March 29, 1993 
the District Superintendent sent the following letter. 
You were hired on a One Year Contract for the 1992-93 school 
year. This letter is to notify you that, as of tbs time, the school 
district does not anticipate needing your services for the coming 
year. Thank you for your services rendered to the students of 
School District 91 during this school year. If a future position 
should open for which you are qualified, I hope you would submit 
your application. Id. 
The Court ultimately ruled that the Board of Trustees failed to take proper action pursuant to the 
then existing version of Idaho Code § 33-513(1) which provided for teacher contract renewal. 
The Court found the District in Rhodes erred '·when the superintendent, instead of the board, 
gave the teacher the reason for not reemploying her in the March 291 1993 letter, and there was 
no evidence that the district implemented· a reduction in force pursuant to the policy in the 
negotiated agreement." Id. at 830. 
The holding in Rhodes requires District's to abide by Idaho Code for reductions in force, 
or a decision not to renew a non-continuing contract teacher's contract. The case addresses 
employment contracts. The holding does not analyze voluntary agreements between teachers and 
a school district. As a result, the ruling in Rhodes does nothing to support the NEA' s argument 
that the voluntary addendum contracts are as a matter of law illegal. 
Moreover, the voluntary addendum contracts were a one-time> voluntary measure on 
behalf of District employees. The voluntariness of the agreement is evidenced by the affidavit of 
Steve Kipp (former human resource officer for the District), which is properly before the Court, 
and attached to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment In his affidavit, Mr. Kipp avers to 
the fact that once approximately 545 staff members volunteered one or more furlough days, 
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approximateiy 24 certified teachers later modified their agreements, either adding to or reducing 
the number of volunteer furlough days. (Aff. of Steve Kipp p. 
C. The affidavit of Mandy Simpson is based on n,nnri·1111 anti Petiti<mer objects to 
consideration of portions of the affidavit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(e). 
I.R.C.P. 56(e), Form of Affidavit-Further Testimony Defense Required, provides in 
relevant part: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. 
To support the pertinent assertions in her affidavit regarding the coercion of teachers to 
sign the vohmtary addendum contracts, Ms. Simpson relies on the out of court statements of 
others. In her affidavit Ms. Simpson alleges, "On or about the week of December 10, 2012, the 
Nampa School District began pressuring teachers to sign an addendum contract by requiring 
teachers to attend mandatory "emergency" meetings where the addendum contract was 
presented." Simpson Aff. pp. 7. Ms. Simpson further states "many teachers were told that the 
addendum contracts had to be signed and returned within a matter of a few days." Simpson Aff. 
pp. 9. Ms. Simpson also states "teachers expressed fear of retaliation should they not sign the 
addendum contracts or if they were to publically state that the contracts were not voluntarily 
signed." Simpson Aff. pp. 10. 
The above assertions are hearsay, and not subject to any hearsay exception provided by 
the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Additionally paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 13, and 14 of Ms. Simpson's 
affidavit are based on hearsay. Since the testimony in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13 and 14 of 
Ms. Simpson's affidavit would not be admissible in court, Respondent objects to consideration 
of those paragraphs pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(e). 
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ID. CONCLUSION 
The NEA has failed to respond to the Disrrict's Motion for Summary Judgment, or 
address the standing issue before the court. Since the has failed to establish standing in 
order to bring this action, it follows that Petitioner also lacks standing to bring this Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Additionally paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13 and 14 of the affidavit of 
Mandy Simpson are based on hearsay. As a result, Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment 
should be denied, Respondent's Motion for Summa.ry Judgment should be granted, and the 
objection to the above-mentioned paragraphs of Ms. Simpson's affidavit should be noted by the 
Court. 
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of July, 2013. 
YOST LAW, PLLC 
By: __ v __ -_____ _ 
Chip Giles 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of July, 2013, I caused to be served by the method 
indicated below a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon: 
Paul J. Stark 
Idaho Education Association 
620 North 6th St 
POBox2638 




lL Facsimile No. 344-1606 
Chip Giles 
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Paul J. Stark, Esq.- ISB #5919 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
620 North Sixth Street 
P.O. Box 2638 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 333-8560 
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 











Case No.: CVl 3-2962-C 
PETITIONER'S ME~10Rf\NDCM 
IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGrv1ENT 
ARGUME~T 
A. Petitioner has Standing to Bring this Action. 
Under Idaho case law precedent, Petitioner has stai:ding to bring this matter be:o:e the 
court on a declaratory judgment. Accordingly, Responden:'s :v1otion for Summary Judgment on 
the argument Petitioner lacks standing must be denied. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in the case of Bear Lake Educ. Ass 1n v. Board of Trs. of Bear 
Lake Sch. Dist. No. 33, 116 Idaho 443, 776 P.2d 452 (l 989), definitively he1d that a11 association, 
must like Petitioner in this case, have standing to bring an a~tion on behalf of its teachers as well 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JCDGMENT - 1 
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as on its own behalf. In Bear Lake, the District Court ruled in favor of the School District on a 
summary judgment motion, however the Idaho Supreme Comt vacated the order and remanded 
the case back to the District Court. Id. at 444, 776 P,2d at 453. Much like this case, the School 
District in Bear Lake argued that the Bear Lake Education Association did not have standing to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the court. 
After reciting the law on standing, the Idaho Supreme Court held, "There is no question 
that an association may have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from i11jury to itself 
and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy." Id. at 448, 776 
P.2d at 457 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)). The Court went on to 
conclude, "If in a proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form 
of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the 
benefit of those members of the association actually injured. Id. Indeed, Petitioner's "interest in 
having the agreement[s] enforced is germane to the Association's purpose and affects the 
associational ties of all the teachers." Id. at 448, 776 P.2d at 457. 
Here, as in Bear Lake, the Nampa Education Association was chosen as the exclusive 
organization to represent all of the certificated educators in the Nampa School District 
(excluding administrators). See Affidavit of Mandy Simpson 1,i 2-4. See also Idaho Code §33-
1273. Further, as in Bear Lake, the relief requested by Petitioner is that contractual terms, as 
well as statutory mandates, be enforced. The terms of the Standard Teacher Contract signed by 
all the teachers in the Nampa School District incorporate by reference the laws of the state of 
Idaho, the Rules of the Board of Education and the policies of the School District as follows: 
It is understood and agreed between the parties that this Contract is subject to the 
applicable laws of the State of Idaho, the duly adopted rules of the State Board of 
Education and the policies of the District which are, by reference, incorporated 
herein and made a part of this agreement the same as if fully set forth herein. 
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superintendent of public instruction) as well as IDAP A .150 (proliibiting unapproved 
deviations from the Standard Teacher Contract). Petitioner bas alleged actual or threatened 
injury by way of the four ( 4) unpaid furlough days and that t:ie Addendum Contract:, v:ere: not 
voluntarily entered into by Petitioner's members. See Petition Declaratory Judg::nent; 
Affidavit of Mandy Simpson. A :finding of individualized ir:jury, hmvever, is unnecessary. The 
Idaho Supreme Court, determining associational standing has held: 
The question of associational standing often turns on the n2.ture of the relief 
sought. When an association seeks so.me form of prospective relief such as a 
declaration or an injunction, its benefits will l1kely be shared by the association's 
members without any need for individualized fr1<lings of injury tha: ;,vould 
require the direct participation of its members as named pwies. Hunt [ v. 
Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 ( 977)] 432 U.S. at 343, 97 
S.Ct. at 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d at 394. "Indeed," wrote United States Sup::ene 
Court in Hunt, ''in all cases in v,;hlch we have expressiy recognized standing in 
associations to represent their members, the relief has been of this kine." 
Id (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 515, 95 S.Ct. at 2213, L.Ed.2d at 364). 
Moreover, the violation of statutory rights, not only by incorporation into cont,act, but 
also by virtue of their existence as standalone statutory protections for teachers, can itself create 
the requisite injury. As the Court further held: "[S]tanding often turns on the nature and sou:-ce 
of the claim asserted, the actual or threatened injury maY exist solely by Yirtue of 'statutes 
creating legal rights.'" Id. at 448-49, 776 P.2d at457-58 (quofing Linda R.S v. Richard D., 410 
C .S. 614, 617 (1973)). And here, as in Bear Lake, the possibili:y that t.he School Board 1..vou;d be 
allowed to unilaterally terminate/modify the Standard Teacher Contract "affects all :he 
members and, therefore, vests the Association \vith standir:g." Id at 449, 776 P.2d at 458. 
PETITIONER'S MEMORA.1"'IDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTlO"J FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMEKT - 3 
The language of the Declaratory Judgment Act iBc::f ciemonstrates that has 
standing to bring this action and that it was the legislatures to for such as the 
case at bar. Idaho Code § !0-1212 in particular demonstrate the nature of a declaratory 
judgment action, "This act is declared t0 be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief 
from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, stat.1s anc ot:1er legal relations, a:1d is co be 
liberally construed and administered.'' The broad scope this act is further supported 
criteria of what sort of determinations can be sought. Idaho Code § I 0-1202 provides: 
Anv person interested under a deed, \Vilt, ·written contract 01: other writings 
constituting a contract or any oral contract, or ·whose rights, status or o:her lega: 
relations are aftected by a statute, municipal ordinance. contract or franchise, mav 
have determined anv question of construction or validity arising under the 
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. 
the 
(Emphasis added.) Idaho Code§ 10-1213 defines "person" to include parties such as Petitioner. 
Moreover, a contract may be construed either before or after t:.1ere has been a breach. Ide.ho 
Code§ 10-1203. It is also noteworthy that a court is vested with authority to make declaratory 
determinations of rights '"whether or not further relief is or be c :aimed." Idaho Code § l 0-
1201. 
Based upon the forgoing, Petitioner has standing to bring this declaratory judgxent 
action and Respondent's summary judgment on these grounds must be denied. 
B. Petitioner's Claims are Not Moot. 
Petitioner's claims are not moot because there is a definite 2nd concrete legs.i issue co be 
resolved that touches upon the legal relations of the parties having adverse legal interests. 
The standard for determining whether an issue is moot in 2. declaratory judgment action 
was articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court just a few months ago in the case of Bett·,vieser v. 
New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317,297 P.3d 1134 (2013). In Betttt,ieser, the Court held 
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that under Idaho's Declaratory Judgment Act, the trial s jurisdiction is limited to cases 
"where an actual or justiciable controversy exists," and cmms are precluded "from deciding 
cases which are purely hypothetical or advisory." Id. at 326, P.3d a 1143 (qu01ing 
Idaho Transp. Bd., 151 Idaho 26, 31,253 P.3d 700, 705 (2011 The Beuv:ieser Cow1 v,ent on 
to discuss the factors involved in determining whether a justiciable cor:troversy exists as follows: 
This Coun has explained that a justiciable controversy 
[D]istinf::,ruished from a difference or dispute a hypothetical or 
abstract character; from one that is academ:c or moot .... The 
controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal 
relations of the parties having adverse legal interests .... It must be a 
real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through 
a decree of a conclusive character, as distingt:ished from an 
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state 
of facts. 
Davidson v. Wright, 143 Idaho 616, 620, 151 P.3d 812, 816 (2006) (quoting 
Weldon v. Bonner County Tax Coalition, 124 Idaho 31, 36, 855 P.2d 868, 873 
(1993)). Therefore, "[a]n action for declaratory judgment is moot where the 
judgment, if granted, would have no effect either directly or collaterally on the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff would be unable to obtain farther relief based on the 
judgment and no other relief is sought in the action." FVylie, 151 Idaho at 32,253 
P.3d at 706 (quoting Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v Idaho State Bd 
of Educ., 128 Idaho 276,282,912 P.2d 644,650 (1996)). 
Betf1;1.•ieser v. Nen York Irrigation Dist., J 54 Idaho 317, 297 P.3d 1134 (2013). 
Applying the standards articulated above, Petitioner's claims are clearly not moo:, but 
actual and justiciable. There is nothing hypothetical or abstract about Petitioner's claim. 
Respondent violated a clear and unambiguous requirement of both statute and rule by creating its 
own unapproved contract that modified the terms and conditions of employment existing in the 
approved Standard Teacher Contract. Then the School District administration acting alone and 
without any approval of the School Board required teachers to atter:d mai,datory "eoergency" 
meetings where many were pressured to sign the addendum contracts. See Affidavtt of M~'ldy 
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Simpson. By doing so, teachers in the school district lmd 
protections violated. This is not a hypothetical or abstract 
controversy, touching the Jegal relations of the ).Tampa 
judgment in favor of Petitioner in this matter would have a 
contractual and statutory 
but a definite and concrete 
and its teachers. a 
effec.: on both Petitioner r:11d al'. 
the teachers because it would prevent this sort of illegal actiYity in futur~ a:od either would be 
able to obtain further relief based on the judgment under Code ~ l 0-1201. It simply 
cannot be said that judgment if granted to Petitioner "wouk: have no effect either directly or 
collaten•Jly on [Petitioner]." Bettwieser, supra. ln sho::-t, there is an actual and justiciable 
controversy in this matter that had reaJ financial conseqciences tha:. is also cape.bk of being 
repeated in the future. 
Respondent asserts that due to the mere passage of time that Petitioner's claims are moot. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, ho\.vever, has squarely rejected such "passage of time" a:·gu:1:ents. 
See School Dist. No. 351 Oneida County v. Oneida Ed Ass'n. 98 Idaho 486, 489, 567 P.2d 830, 
833 (1977). See also Robinson v. Bodily, 541 P.2d 623, 624, 97 Idaho 199, 200 (1975); ,Velson 
v. Marshall, 94 ldaho 726,728,497 P.2d 47, 49 (1972). 
In addition, as a matter of public policy, these teacher protections should be safeguarded 
from illegal modifications u.,_11der so called addendum contracts. \Vhether some z,ddendurn 
contracts may have been voluntary and others may not h,rve been is itTelevant if tk comracts 
themselves were illegal ab initio. Since the right to have a teaching contract only on a fo:-m 
approved by 1.he state superintendent of public instruction is established by stamte, there is an 
issue of whether such modifications or waivers, voluntary or other.vise, are prohibited as a 
matter of public policy. There appears to be little by way of Ic.aho Supreme Com~ c2.Se law on 
this issue. Legal scholars, however, have explained that \\'hen a law is establish.ea for a public 
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reason, it cannot be contravened by a p1ivate agreemen: rights guaranteed u:--,der a 
statute: 
It is obvious what when a right, a privilege, or a is confened upon an 
individual by the law, it is conferred upon him because it is believed to be in the 
public interest to do so. In many such cases it is believed to be contrary to the 
public interest to permit him to ,vaive or bargain away the right, privilege, or 
defense; and when it is so believed the attempted waiver or bargair. is inopc:-ative. 
In these cases the waiver or bargain may itself be described as 'illegal' but on~y in 
the sense that it jg legally L'10perative. 
6A Corbin, Contracts, § 1515 "Power to Waive or Bargain Away Rights and Defenses Conferred 
by Statute" pp. 728-73 L 
The proper manner to modify the terms and conditions of a Standard Teacher Contract 
is to either utilize the collective bargaining process contained in Idaho Code § 1271 et seq, or 
to declare a financial emergency pursuant to Idaho Code §33-522. There is simply no statutory 
a'..Ithority whatsoever for a school district to draft its own unapproved I contracts changing the 
terms of employment, and then bypass the exclusive bargainir,g representative (see Idaho Code 
§33-1273) and direct dealing with the teachers. See Napervi!l::: Ready Mix, Inc v. R.B, 242 
F.3d 744 (2001). 
Accordingly, Petitioner's claims are not moot anc summary judgment on these grounds 
must be denied. 
C. Petitioner's Claims are Ripe. 
There is a real and substantial controversy as to whether the addendum contracts were 
Iega1. The illegality of those contracts would make modifications of the Standard Teacher 
Unapproved by either the superintendent of public instruction and/or by the Nampa School District Board 
of Trustees. See Gilmore v. Bonner County School Dist. No. 82, 132 Idaho 257,260, 971 P.2d 323,326 (1999) 
("The board has the responsibility and exclusive authority to employ both professional and noncerti:icated personnel 
necessary to maintain and operate the schools in the district. The board and the teachers within the school district 
expect that the board will make employment decision and that those decisions will follow the correct statutory 
procedure.) (citations omitted.) 
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Contracts void as a matter of law. Further, the furlough that came about fro:n illegal 
addendum contracts have real and significant financial consec.uences upon the already budened 
teachers in the school district Thus, the illegality of the contracrs is the 
court's consideration and Respondent's motion for summary judgment on ripeness grounds must 
be denied. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: "The tradi1iornJ.l ripeness doctrine requires a 
petitioner or plaintiff to prove 1) that the case presents definite and concrete issues, that a real 
and substantial controversy exists, and 3) that there is a present need for adj;;dication." Noh v. 
Cenarrusa, 137 Jdaho 798, 801, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002) (citing Boundary Backpackers v. 
Boundmy Cnty .. 128 Idaho 371,376,913 P.2d 1141, 1146 C 996)). 
As argued above, this case presents definite and concrete issues. The statutory 
requirement that teachers only be employed on a form approved by the superintendent of public 
instruction is clear and unambiguous. The rule of the State Board Education that there car: be 
no deviation from the approved Standard Teacher Contracr is likewise clear and U'12.nbiguous. 
The Respondent flatly ignored these importa.rit protections for teachers and crafted their own 
contract modifying the approved form for their own pu:poses. The Respondent then forced 
teachers to attend a mandatory "emergency" meeting to procure i:he signing o: the illegal 
contracts. Further, should the court not address these issues, there is nothing to pre·vent these 
improper and illegal actions from occurring in the fuu:re. The mere passage of time will 
continue to be asserted as a mechanism to violate the clear mandates of the law. Rea'. and 
concrete issues are currently before the court, which need to be 2.ddressed to prevent such ac:ions 
in the future and to uphold the statutory protections of teachers. 
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A real and substantial controversy exists as well. PetitioTier maintains that addendum 
contract, voluntary or not, are per se illegal as a matter . See 1'vforriso11 v. Yo1mg, 136 
Idaho 316, 317, 32 P.3d 1116, 1117 (200 l)("\Vhether a contract is illegal is a question oflaw for 
the Court to determine from all the facts and circumstances of each case."). Respondent's 
position is that the addendum contracts are legal and See A.ns·wer ro Petition for 
Declaratory, Judgment. \\'hether such addendum contracts are legal or illegal is a real and 
substantial difference. 
Lastly, there is an absolute and present need for adjudication. TI1e use of an addendum 
contract by Respondent is something that has not occurred before in [daho. Respondent is 
plowing new soi] by executing a Standard Teacher Contract in September 2012 and then 
drafting its o\vn unapproved contract just 3 months later. Further, the undisputed fact that the 
School Board did not approve of such addendum contracts is also unprecedented in Idaho. Such 
actions by Respondent, if upheld, would render the statute protecting teachers from such conduct 
a nullity. See Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 lda:io 107,116,233 P.3d 38, 47 (2009) 
("[I]t is not to be presumed that the legislature performed an idle &ct of enacting a superfluous 
statute."). The parties need an adjudication of this issue for not only this immediate matter, but 
also future attempts to bypass the statutory protections of teachers. 
CONCLUSION" 
Based upon the foregoing, Respondent's summary judgment motion must be denied. 
1-::l-,~' 
DATED this~ day of July, 2013. 
IDAHO EDUCATION ,ASSOCIATION 
(_ l i. f .r .( r / ,, .¥ ,,, i 
By ·. ; L). 1e:-·•,1, "~ ~ ,,,~ " v~1 • "" ,._/ -~ 
Pauv.f /Stark 
AttdJJtey for Plaintiff Nampa Educati::m Association 
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copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM TK OPPOSHIO:-J TO 
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WilJirun F. "Bud" Yost 
Yost Law, PLLC 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CF'{AWFORD, OEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, ) 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131. 
Respondent. 








RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
______________ ) 
COMES NOW the Respondent, NAMPA SCHOOL DISTR1CT NO. 131, (''District") by 
and through its counsel of record, William F. Yost and Chip Giles, of Yost Law, PLLC, and replies 
to Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment as 
follows: 
ARGUMENT 
A. The voluntary agreements to take furlough days were not subject to Idaho Code 
Section 33-513. 
The reply regarding standing is under Section B below. The issue regarding the vohmtary 
agreements between the teachers and the District is not subject to Idaho Code Section 33w513, 
which provides as follows: 
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The board of trustees of each school district including any 
specifically chartered district, shall have the following powers and 
duties: 
l. To employ professional personnel, on written contract in a 
form approved by the state superintendent of public 
instruction, conditioned upon a valid certificate being held 
by such professional personnel at the time of entering upon 
the duties thereunder. (Emphasis added.) 
Idaho Code Section 33-513 applies only to the initial teacher employment contracts, and 
does not apply to the voluntary agreements regarding furlough days used by the District. 
Petitioner has provided no authority to subject the voluntary agreements to subject to Idaho Code 
Section 33-513. The intent of the agreements regarding furlough days and the voluntary nature of 
those agreements is absolutely clear. These agreements speak for themselves, as there is no 
' ' ' 
ambiguity or any lack of clarity. The City of Meridian v. Petra Incorporated, 154 Idaho 425, 299 
P.3d 232 (2013). 
If a Mitten contract is complete upon its face and unambiguous, 
and no party alleges any fraud or mistake, "extrinsic evidence of 
prior or contemporaneous negotiations or conversations is not 
admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to, or detract from the 
terms of the contract.'' · 
The City of Meridian, 299 PJd 232, 241, citing Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 141, 106 P.3d 
465, 467 (2005). 
The voluntary agreements with the teachers of the District were not employment 
contracts by definition, and were only one of several mechanisms utilized by District to 
temporarily aid the significant cash-flow problem. 
B. The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Bear Lake Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Trs. of 
Bear Lake School Dist. No. 33 does not establish standing for- Petitioner. 
In its Memorandum in Opposition, Petitioner seeks to establish standing based on the 
Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in Bear Lake Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Trs. of Bear Lake School 
Dist. No. 33, 116 Idaho 443, 776 P.2d 452 (1989). Bear Lake involved the Bear Lake Education 
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Association;s petition to compel the Bear Lake School District Board of Trustees to honor a 
provision of the Districts master agreement regarding arbitration of a grievance. One issue 
before the Court was whether the association could assert standing. On review the Idaho 
Supreme Court granted the association standing, recognizing that the Bear Lake Education 
Association was a party to the master agreement. (Emphasis added). 
In Bear Lake, the court dealt with a master agreement executed by the Bear Lake School 
District and the Bear Lake Education Association. 
The Supreme Court for the State of Idaho looked to the United States Supreme Court for 
guidance in defining associational standing, holding: 
There is no question that an a<;sociation may have standing in its 
own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to 
vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may 
enjoy. Moreover, in attempting to secure relief from injury to itself 
the Association may assert the rights of its members, at least so 
long as the challenged infractions adversely affect its members' 
associational ties. Id. at 457 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 
449 (1958)). 
In Bear Lake, the education association's petition involved a member's right to arbitrate 
his grievance and the refusal to arbitrate by the district. The right was provided for in the master 
agreement. Based upon a clearly defined injury (a refusal to arbitrate), the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that the denial of the grievance process adversely affected association member's 
associational ties, "since any breach of the master agreement would in turn be injurious to the 
association." Bear Lake Educ. Ass'n, 116 Idaho at 457. 
In this case before the Court, NEA is not a party to the teacher voluntary addendum 
contracts. Additionally, the NBA has failed to provide the Court with any evidence of injury to 
itself. or an infraction adversely affecting any of its member's associational ties. The only 
evidence before the Court is the Affidavit of Mandy Simpson, which fails to allege any injury to 
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herself, any infraction adversely affecting her tie to the NEA as a member, or immediate or 
threatened hann. 
The Bear Lake Court further held: 
The association must allege that its members, or any one of them, 
are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the 
challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case 
had the members themselves brought suit. Bear Lake Educ. Ass 'n 
116 Idaho at 457, citing Sierra Club v. Morton 405 U.S. 727, 734-
41 (1972). 
In Bear Lake, the denial of the right to arbitrate created an immedjate injury. Had the iajured 
teacher filed individually, a justiciable claim would have then existed. That would be sufficient 
under the Bear Lake case to allow the NEA to have standing. However, the NEA has failed to 
properly allege that any of its members are or were suffering an immediate or threatened injury 
resulting from entering into a voluntary addendum to contribute furlough days. 
Lastly, the Bear Lake Court held: 
Any injury to an individual teacher \Vithin the Association as a 
result of breaching the Master Agreement would in turn be 
injurious to the Association. Both the Asso.ciation as a party to the 
agreement, and each individual teacher as a member of the 
Association, have an interest in having the agreement enforced and 
interpreted for this and future relations. Bear Lake Educ. Ass 'n 116 
Idaho at 457. 
The NEA has failed to provide any evidence to this Court that any individual teacher has 
been iajured, or that any member of the NBA has any interest in the requested relief of declaring 
the addendum contracts unlawful and unenforceable. Therefore, unlike Bear Lake, there is no 
iajury to an individual teacher which would also be injurious to the NEA. The NEA cannot 
establish standing under the legal analysis and holding in Bear Lake. 
The NEA also fails to establish standing urider Idaho Code. Idaho Code 53-
707, Capacity to Assert and Defend- standing, provides: 
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(i) A nonprofit association, in its name. may institute; defend, 
intervene or participate in a judicial> administrative or other 
governmental proceeding or in an arbitration, mediation or any 
other form of alternative dispute resolution. 
(2) A nonprofit association may assert a claim in its name on 
behalf of its members if one ( 1) or more members of the nonprofit 
association have standing to assert a claim in their own righti the 
interests the nonprofit association seeks to protect are germane to 
its purposes and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested 
requires the participation of a member. 
The NEA can only assert a claim in its name on behalf of its members if: ( 1) One or more 
members have standing to assert a claim; (2) the interest the NEA seeks to protect is germane to 
its purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation 
of a member. 
The NEA has failed to establish standing as no NBA member can ''allege or demonstrate 
an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or 
redress the claimed injury." Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641 778 P.2d 757, 763 
( 1989). Since the NEA cannot produce a member with a redressable injury, the NEA does not 
have standing under Idaho Code Section 53-707. 
The interest sought by the NEA of asking this court to declare that an executed and fully-
performed voluntary agreement, ( of which it is not a party to) unlawful or unenforceable is not 
germane to the NEA's purpose. Lastly, the claim asserted by the NEA requires the participation 
of a member, and at this point, the NEA has failed to provide at least one member to claim such 
injury. As a result. the NEA fails to meet its burden under Idaho Code Section 53-707. 
C. Based on Idaho case law, Petitioner's clahn is moot. 
The teachers who volunteered to take furlough days without pay and executed the 
voluntary addendum contracts have fully performed and taken the furlough days; and, therefore, 
no controversy exists. 
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Since no controversy exists, and Petitioner)s claim is moot. Petitioner cites the recently 
decided case of Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist which held that under Idaho's 
Declaratory Judgment Act a trial court's jurisdiction is limited to cases "where an actual or 
justiciable controversy exists;; and courts are precluded "from deciding cases which are purely 
hypothetical or advisory." Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist.; 154 Idaho 317,297 P.3d 1134 
(2013). 
Petitioner correctly defines the standard adopted by the court, but arrives at the wrong 
conclusion. Bettwieser and other cases cited in Respondent's motion stand for the proposition 
that an issue is moot if there is no justiciable controversy. (See Idaho County Property Owners 
Ass 'n., Inc. v. Syringa, "an issue is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial 
determination will have no practical effect on thtfoutcome;'' and Koch v. Idaho County, 145 
Idaho 158, 163 177 P.3d 372,377 (2008), '' ... an issue will become moot ifit does not present a 
real and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief/') 
The addendum contracts at issue before this Court were voluntary and have now been 
completely performed by those teachers who volunteered furlough days. This court is unable to 
grant such relief. Id The Court would be required to decide a hypothetical case and/or render an 
advisory opinion. There is no authority presented to the court that establishes any violation of a 
statute or rule by the District, or to support any determination that the voluntary addendum 
contracts were illegal as a matter of law. It would be the position of District that Bettwieser 
stands for the proposition that an advisory opinion would be precluded as being moot, and such a 
decision is supported by the cases cited above by the District dealing with the issue of mootness. 
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D. Petitioner's claims fail under the Idaho ripeness doctrine. 
As provided in this Reply, and in Respondent's Memorandum in Support its Motion 
for Summary Judgment, it is clear to the Respondent that Petitioner has failed to present a 
definite and concrete issue as it has failed to submit any evidence to this Court of any injury. Noh 
v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798,801, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002) (citing Boundary Backpackers v. 
Boundary Cnty .• 128 Idaho 371, 376, 913 P.2d 1141, 1146 (1996)). As stated in Respondent's 
first Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, there is no real or 
substantial controversy in this matter as the voluntary addendum contracts have been fully 
executed and performed. Absent an injury and/or a substantial controversy, there is no need for 
adjudication, and Petitioner's claim fails under the ripeness doctrine. 
CONCLlJSION 
Respondenfs Motion for Simrma:ry Judgment should be granted, and Petitioner's Cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of July; 2013. 
YOST LAW, PLLC 
By: _ ___,,---..1-__,.__.,,,.,, _______ _ 
Chip Giles 
Attorney for Respondent 
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NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
Case No.: CV13-2962-C 
PETITIONER'S REPLY MEMOl~A.KDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
ARGUMENT 
A. It is Undisputed that the ''Addendum Contracts" Were Not on a Form Approved by 
the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and are Therefore, as a Matter of 
Law, Illegal. 
Respondent has not raised any issue of fact, beyond mere allegations and denials, as to 
the issue of whether the addendum contracts were on a form approved by the state 
superintendent of public instruction. There is absolutely no evidence in the record whatsoever 
that the addendum contracts were so approved. Accordingly, there is no issue of material fact on 
this issue and this Court, as a matter of law, should rule that the addendum contracts were 
illegal. 
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) set forth the requirements opposing a motion for 
summary judgment, providing in pertinent part as follows: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that 
party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided 
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against the party. 
Worthen v. State, 96 Idaho 175, 176, 525 P.2d 957,958 (1974); Ambrose v. Buhl Joint School 
District No. 412, 126 Idaho 581, 584, 887 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Ct. app. 1995). Two well-respected 
commentators on federal summary judgment practice have made clear that a party opposing a 
motion for summary judgment may not rely on allegations, assertions or speculation to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact; rather, such party must present specific evidence in order to 
defend a summary judgment motion. C. Wright. A. Miller & Kane, "Federal Practice & 
Procedure: Civil 3d, § 2739 (1998) at pp. 378-389 and cases cited therein; 11 '.Moore's Federal 
Practice,§ 56.13[2] and [4] (Matthew Bender 3rd ed. 2001) and cases cite<l therein. 
Rather than address the substantive issue of the legality of the addendum contracts, 
Respondent instead has chosen to attempt to blur the issue by resting their opposition on a false 
theory that the addendum contracts were "voluntary" and therefore a violation of the statute (33-
513) and the Rule (IDAPA 08.02.01.150) are of no consequence. Indeed, it may be said of 
nearly all contracts in Idaho, including the Standard Teacher Contract, that such is entered into 
voluntarily. Whether the addendum contract was voluntary or not is a simply a red herring. 
There is no "voluntary" exception or qualifier to Idaho Code § 33-513 or IDAPA 08.02.01.150. 
The law is clear and unambiguous. A teacher's employment can only be governed by an 
approved form and there can be no deviation from the approved form. Whether Respondent 
claims it was voluntary or not is irrelevant to this analysis due to the undisputed fact that there is 
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no evidence in that record that the addendum contract was ever approved. Further, Respondent 
has not at any time even alleged that it was approved. 
Moreover, some statutory rights cannot be waived. In this case, it is quite obvious that 
the legislature, by enacting the requirement of approved forms in Idaho Code § 33-513, and 
prohibiting any unapproved deviations in IDAPA 08.02.01.150, intended to protect teachers 
from just the sort of gerrymandering, whether it was voluntary or not. Taking the Respondent's 
argument to its logical conclusion, one could equally say that truth in lending laws governing the 
actions between a bank and a borrower can be voluntarily waived by a bank drafted addendum 
contract. Certainly there exists the same disparity in power between and bank ~md a lender as 
there is between a teacher and the School District. The same can be said for protections under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act where an employee waives their statutory right to overtime pay 
under an addendum contract. Stated simply, there are statutory protections established to protect 
individuals that cannot be waived, no matter how strenuous the employee may wish to believe 
that the agreement was truly voluntary. That jg not the issue. The issue is whether the employer 
complied with the clear mandates of the law. In this situation, Respondent did not. 
B. The Nampa Education Association Has Standing to Pursue This Action. 
Pursuant to Idaho Supreme Court case law, the Nampa Education Association has 
standing to bring this action. Particularly, the case of Bear Lake Educ. Ass 'n v. Board cf Trs. of 
Bear Lake Sch. Dist. No. 33, 116 Idaho 443, 776 P.2d 452 (1989) is on point and controlling. 
In Bear Lake, the Bear Lake Education Association appealed the granting of summary 
judgment in favor of the School District in relation to the School District's refusal to adhere to 
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provisions of the Master Agreement. 1 On appeal, the School District contested the standing of 
the education association to maintain the action against the schoo] district. These are the exact 
same arguments being presented in this case. 
The Court in Bear Lake addressed the same arguments being presented in the case at bar. 
Respondent's arguments revolve around two premises: First, the Nampa Education Association 
has not suffered any injury. In Bear Lake the Court addressed the injury argument and held, 
"Any injury to an individual teacher within the Association as a result of breaching the Master 
Agreement would in turn be injurious to the Association.'' Id. at 448, 776 P.2d at 457. The 
Court went on to declare "Further, as standing often tums on the nature and source of the claim 
asserted, the actual or threatened injury may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legaJ 
rights."' Id. at 448-49, 776 P.2d at 457-58 (quoting Linda R.S v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,617 
(1973)). 
In this case, the Nampa Education Association, much like the Bear Lake Education 
Association, has associational standing because an injury to any one of the teachers by the 
Respondent's statutory violations, "would in turn be injurious to the Association." Bear Lake, 
supra. Also, the fact that Idaho Code § 33-513 is a statute creating rights (or better yet 
protections), this may be the sole basis of actual or threatened injury. 
Respondent also contests standing on the part of the Nampa Education Association on an 
assertion that any relief would do nothing to prevent future harm or redress current harm. 
Respondenf s basis for this argument is that in the time that it has taken to get before this Court 
Respondent in its Respondent's Rep(v to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment (at p. 4) confuse the 
Standard Teacher Contract and the Master Agreement. For clarity, a Sta:-idard Teacher Contract is an individual 
contract signed by each teacher in every school district in Idaho. The Standard Teacher Contra;,;t incorporates by 
reference the terms of the Master Agreement. A Master Agreement (a/k/a Collective Bargaining Agreement) is a 
contract negotiated by the local education organization (see Idaho Code §S 33-1272, 1273) on behalf ofall teachers 
within the bargafrling unit, both member and non-member of the association. 
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the illegal contracts have been fully perfonned, and therefore there is no harm. There is no case 
law to support such an assertion. Indeed it would be a grave injustice to allow a statutory 
violation to occur and then strike down an attempt to seek judicial relief due to the mere passage 
of time. 
The Nampa Education Association has an interest in pursuing this claim on behalf of its 
members and the non-members it represents not on]y to gain the ability to redress the past 
statutory and rule violations (see Idaho Code§ 10-1201), but also to prevent such statutory and 
rule violations 1n the future. If the Respondent is allowed 1o violate the statute and rule in 1his 
contract year, there is nothing to prevent it from happening again and again. 
It is noteworthy that Respondent's arguments in opposition to Petitioner's Motion for 
Summary Judgment focus nearly entirely on standing, and avoid the very merits of the claims, 
namely the legality or illegality of the addendum contracts. Accordingly, once the Nampa 
Education Association's standing to bring this matter has been established, there is virtually no 
assertions or argument on the part of Respondent contradicting the assertion that the statute and 
rule relating to teacher contracts have been violated. Therefore, this Court should grant 
Petitioner's motion for summary judgment. 
C. Respondent's Attempt to Distinguish the "Addendum Contract" from an 
Employment Contract is Unfounded. 
The addendum contract is an agreement that changes the terms and conditions of a 
teacher's employment. There can be no dispute that this is an emplo)'IDent contract. Further, 
there has been no argument presented contesting the assertion that the addendum contract was 
never approved by the state superintendent of public instruction. Further, there is no argument 
contradicting the assertion that the Nampa School District Board of Trustees ever approved such 
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addendum contract. In short, in cannot be disputed that the addendum contracts are illegal and 
unenforceable. 
First, the addendum contracts are indisputably employment contracts as contemplated in 
Idaho Code § 33-513. The addendum contract is titled "Addendum to Continuing Teacher 
Contract." See Affidavit of Steve Kipp, Exhibit A. Tue contract is not a standalone contract, but 
is an unauthorized contractual modification of the Standard Teacher Contract The first 
''Recital" of the addendum contract provides "District and Teacher entered into a State of Idaho 
Continuing Teacher Contract dated_ day of Sept, 2012, for the school year 2012-2013." Id. 
Later in paragraph 1 of the addendum contract this Standard Teacher Contract is incorporated 
into the addendum contract: 
1. INCORPORATION OF RECITALS: 1be above recitals are contractual and 
binding and are incorporated herein as if set forth 1n full. 
Id. The addendum contract discusses changes in the number of days that will be worked 
(paragraph 2), the term of the agreement is the same as the school year and tenninates at the 
same time the Standard Teacher Contract Terminates (paragraph 4), and is signed by the teacher 
(employee) and the Chairman of the Nampa School District Board of Trustees (employer). Id. 
Moreover, the Human Resource Officer of the Nampa School District "coordinated the 
presentation process of the agreements from administration to teachers and personnel." Id. ,i 3. 
Despite all this, Respondent now argues that this is not a contract of employment. Such 
arguments are disingenuous and defy the plain language of the document itself 
Second, Respondent has not attempted to argue that the addendum contract was on a 
form approved by the state superintendent of public instruction, as required. This amounts to a 
concession that the addendum contract violates Idaho Code § 33-513. As such, Petitioner's 
summary judgment motion must be granted. 
PETITIONER'S REPLY MEMORAf'..'DlTh-1 IK SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SurvlMARY 
JUDGMENT-6 
Third, Respondent has not presented any evidence of the Nampa School District Board of 
Trustees approval of these addendum contracts. Idaho law is explicit in the requirement that all 
employment decisions can only be made by the Board of Trustees. In Gilmore v. Bonner County 
School Dist. No. 82, 132 Idaho 257, 260, 971 P.2d 323, 326 (1999), the Idaho Supreme Court 
made it exphcit that employment authority must come from the Board of Trustees. 
Under Idaho Code§ 33-501 school districts are governed by a board of tmstees. 
The board has the responsibility and exclusive authority to employ both 
professional and noncertificated personnel necessary to maintain and operate the 
schools in the district. J.C.§ 33-51 l; IC.§ 33-513; J.C.§ 33-517. The board and 
the teachers within the school district expect that the board will make employment 
decisions and that those decisions will follow the correct statutory procedure. 
Brown v. Caldwell School Dist. No. 132, 127 Idaho 112, 898 P .2d 43 ( 1995); 
Rhoades v. Idaho Falls School D~st, No,, 91, ql Idaho 827,965 P.2d 187 (1998). 
They can rely upon employment decisions made in accordance with those 
procedures. Corum v. Common School Dist .. Na. 21, 55 Idaho 725, 47 P.2d 889 
(1935). 
Id. at 260, 971 P.2d at 326. Since there is no evidence in the record that the Nampa School 
District Board of Trustees authorized the addendum contract, in addition to the lack of evidence 
of approval by the state superintendent of pub]ic instruction, the addendum contracts are void. 
Accordingly, Petitioner's motion for summary judgment should be granted. 
C. Respondent's Objections to the Affidavit of :Mandy Simpson are Without Merit. 
The affidavit of Mandy Simpson demonstrates that Ms. Simpson, as both a teacher in the 
Nampa School District and as the President of the Namp~ Education Association, has personal 
knowledge of the facts contained in her affidavit. Accordingly, Respondent's objections should 
be overruled. 
Respondent objects to Ms. Simpson's affidavit on the grounds of hearsay, and argues that 
such statements are inadmissible. Specifically, Respondent objects to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 
13 and 14. The Idaho Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by 
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the dedarant while testifying at the trial o:- hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted." LR.E. 80l(c). Petitioner will address each one of these paragraphs below. 
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 are statements by Ms. Simpson declaring that the Nampa Education 
Association was chosen and recognized by the Nampa School District as the exclusive 
representative of the teachers in the Nampa School District for the 2012-2013 school year, as it 
had been for several decades before. Ms. Simpson established that she is the President of the 
Nampa Education Association in paragraph 1 of her affidavit. As President, certainly she can 
testify on behalf of the organization she represents. Much like a witness under Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), Ms. Simpson represents the Nampa Education Association. It is not 
hearsay for her to testify as to the status of the Nampa Education Association. 
Likewise, paragraphs I 3 deals with Ms. Simpson asking legal counsel to prepare a 
correspondence on behalf of the Nampa Education Association to Respondent, and paragraph 14 
is a copy of said correspondence. These are not hearsay statements, but matters upon which Ms. 
Simpson has direct, first-hand knowledge. If testifying, Ms. Simpson could be subject to cross 
examination as to these statements. These are not out-of-court statements by someone other than 
Ms. Simpson. The correspondence is not "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted" (LR.E. 801(c)), but rather a demonstrative evidence of the actions she had requested to 
be completed. At the very least, exceptions under Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(6) and (8) would 
app]y. 
Respondent further objects to paragraphs 7 and 10 of Ms. Simpson's affidavit. What 
Respondent does not acknowledge is that Ms. Simpson is not only the President of the 
association, representing all members of the bargaining unit, but that she is also a teacher herself 
in the Nampa School District. Idaho Code 33-1272 requires Ms. Simpson to be a teacher in the 
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Nampa School District. As such, she has personal knowledge of the events described in 
paragraphs 7 and 10. In paragraph 15 she so testifies. Further, as the President of the exclusive 
representative organization of all the teachers, she is required under the Duty of Fair 
Representation to communicate with all the teachers within the bargaining lL'lit. Thus, in 
addition to personal knowledge, Ms. Simpson has kno\vledge of what the membership of the 
Nampa Education Association and other teachers were experiencing. As the representative of 
the association, Ms. Simpson is allowed to testify as to the state of mind of her membership. See 
LR.E. 803(3). 
For the reasons discussed above, Respondent's objections to the affidavit of Ms. Simpson 
should be overruled. 
CONCLUSIO~ 
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner is entitled to summary judgment on their Petition for 
Dec]aratory Judgment. 
,\',-' 
DA TED this "2fS' day of July, 20 l 3. 
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
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I. Factual Background 
This case involves no genuine issue of material fact1; instead, the issue is a legal 
one. The case arises as a result of the financial difficulties the Nampa School District 
faced in the fall of 2012. Earlier that year, the Nampa Education Association (NEA) and 
the local Board of Trustees attempted to negotiate the terms of the master employment 
1 Pettioners alleged a material fact - that the teachers were pressured or coerced into 
signing the addendum contracts. However, as held below, the Court has stricken the 
portions of the affidavit that provide the factual support for those allegations for hearsay 
reasons. As such, there is no longer any factual allegation regarding the voluntariness 
of the contract, nor is a review of the voluntariness issue necessary to determine 
whether the addendum contract is illegal on the grounds articulated by the parties. 
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contracts for the teachers of the Nampa School District. Contract negotiations were 
unsuccessful and as a result, no master contract was formalized and the contract salary 
amount in the Continuing Teachers Contract reflected the "last best offer" of the district. 
The Continuing Teachers Contracts (Contract) complied with the State Board of 
Education requirements in all respects and the teachers began teaching pursuant to 
those contracts in the Fall of 2012. 
Thereafter, the Nampa School District faced significant budget shortfalls. The 
Nampa School District Superintendent, through the District's human resource officer, 
drafted an Addendum to Continuing Teacher Contract (Addendum). Neither the local 
Board of Trustees nor the Nampa Education Association (NEA) negotiated the terms of 
this Addendum. The parties agree, although for different reasons, that the Addendum 
Contract does not comply with I.C. § 33-513. The Addendum requests each individual 
teacher donate one to four furlough days for which the teacher would not receive any 
compensation but the accrual or availability of benefits would not be affected. These 
Addendum Contracts were presented to the teachers through meetings at the various 
schools through the school district human resource officer. The Addendum states that 
any contribution of furlough days is voluntary on the part of the teacher. Some, 
although it is not clear how many or what percentage, of the teachers agreed to furlough 
various numbers of days. After signing the initial Addendum Contract, some teachers 
increased or decreased the number of days they had initially agreed to furlough. 
The NEA, the Petitioner in this case, then sent two separate letters to the Nampa 
School District Superintendent, advising him that from the Petitioner's perspective, 
these contracts were illegal because: 1) the contracts amount to illegal direct dealing 
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between the district and the individual teachers; 2) the Petitioner, not individual 
teachers, was the negotiating body for the teachers; and, 3) the contracts were not on a 
form approved by the State Board of Education, in violation of Idaho Code§ 33-513(1 ).2 
The district did not respond and thereafter, the contracts were executed and the 
furlough days were completed. At the time Petitioner instituted the above-entitled action 
asking this Court to declare the contracts illegal as a matter of law, the Addendum 
Contracts had been fully executed and the furlough days had already been applied. 
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The Plaintiff's motion included 
the affidavit of Mandy Simpson, the president of the NEA at the time the Continuing 
Teacher Contracts and Addendum Contracts were executed. The Respondent has 
objected to various paragraphs of Ms. Simpson's Affidavit on hearsay grounds. 
II. Motion to Strike 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides in pertinent part: "[s]upporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein." These requirements "are not satisfied 
by an affidavit that is conclusory, based on hearsay, and not supported by personal 
2 Of note, two different sets of statutes are applicable in this case. At the time the 
Continuing Teachers Contracts were executed, the "Students Come First" legislation 
was in effect. However, following the election in November 2012, those sections of the 
law were repealed by the voters and formalized by the Governor on November 8, 2012. 
Consequently, the Addendum Contract is governed by different law than the Continuing 
Teacher Contract, although the change in the law does not affect the outcome of the 
case. 
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knowledge." Posey v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 141 Idaho 477,483,111 P.3d 162, 168 
(Ct App. 2005)( citing State v. Sha ma Res. Ltd. P'ship, 127 Idaho 267, 271, 899 P.2d 
977, 981 (1995)). Further, when considering evidence presented in support of or 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment, a court can only consider material which 
would be admissible at trial. Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 14, 175 
P.3d 172, 176 (2007)(citing Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal, Co., 92 Idaho 865, 869, 
452 P.2d 362, 366 (1969)). Thus, if the admissibility of evidence presented in support of 
a motion for summary judgment is raised by objection by one of the parties, the court 
must first make a threshold determination as to the admissibility of the evidence "before 
proceeding to the ultimate issue, whether summary judgment is appropriate." Id. at 14, 
176 (citations omitted). 
In this case, the objectionable portions of Ms. Simpson's affidavit are: 
Paragraph 2: The Nampa Education Association was duly chosen as the 
representative organization of the teachers within the Nampa School District for the 
2013-2013 school year. 
Paragraph 3: The Nampa Education Association was recognized by the Nampa 
School District as the representative organization of the teachers within the Nampa 
School District for the 2012-2013 school year. 
Paragraph 4: the Nampa Education Association has been duly chosen and 
recognized as the representative organization of the teachers within the Nampa School 
District for the past several decades. 
Paragraph 7: On or about the week of December 10, 2012, the Nampa School 
District began pressuring teachers to sign an addendum contract by requiring teachers 
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to attend mandatory "emergency" meetings where the addendum contract was 
presented. 
Paragraph 8: Attached as Exhibit "B'' and incorporated by this reference is a true 
and correct copy of the form addendum contract (for both continuing and category A 
contracts). 
Paragraph 9: Many teachers were told that the addendum contracts had to be 
signed and returned within a matter of a few days (December 1th). 
Paragraph 10: Many teachers felt pressured to sign the addendum contracts by 
the Nampa School District and did not consider it voluntary. These teachers expressed 
fear of retaliation should then not sign the addendum contracts or if they were to 
publically [sic] state that the contracts were not voluntarily signed. 
Paragraph 13: During the week of December 10, 2012, where teachers were 
being pressured to sign the addendum contracts, I directed legal counsel to draft a letter 
to the Nampa School District Explaining the situation. 
Paragraph 14: Attached as Exhibit "C" and incorporated by this reference is a 
true and correct copy of a December 14, 2012 letter from Paul Stark to Dr. Thomas 
Michaelson, Superintendent of the Nampa School District. 
Paragraph 153: As the high pressure tactics continued, I again directed legal 
couns8el to draft a second letter to the Nampa School District to explain the situation. 
3 The Court asked why the Respondent did not object to the first phrase of Paragraph 
15 given its other objections. The Respondent indicated it did also object to the 
beginning phrase of Paragraph 15. 
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Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 8 
Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 8 and 14 are all offered for the truth of the matter asserted -
that NEA was, and has been for some time, the exclusive negotiating entity for the 
teachers in the Nampa School District. The Affiant, Ms. Simpson, does not provide a 
factual basis for how she knows this information - whether she has that knowledge as a 
result of her status as the President of the Association or whether she gleaned that 
information from conversations with others. Regardless, the parties all agreed to these 
facts at oral argument so any objection is mooted by the Respondent's subsequent 
acceptance and acknowledgement of these facts. Similarly, although the Addendum 
Contract would be hearsay for which no exception has been offered, all of the parties 
agree that the Addendum Contract submitted is a true and accurate copy, and both 
parties have submitted the document and asked the Court to consider it, as it is the 
subject matter of the underlying action. 
As such, the Court will not strike Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 8 of Ms. Simpson's 
affidavit. 
Paragraph 7, 9, 10, 13, and 15 
Paragraphs 7, 9, 10 and the first phrase of Paragraphs 13 and 15 are hearsay for 
which no exception has been offered. While Ms. Simpson indicates she has "personal 
knowledge" of the facts, it is not clear how she obtained that knowledge and therefore, 
Plaintiff's have not established sufficient foundation establishing that information as 
admissible evidence. As such, paragraphs, 7, 9, 10, the portion of paragraph 13, being 
with the word "During" and ending with the word "contracts," and the first phrase of 
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paragraph 15 will be stricken from the affidavit and will not be considered by this Court 
for purposes of the Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Paragraph 14 
Finally, the fact of sending of the letter as outlined in Paragraph 14 is not 
hearsay, and the Court will consider that the letter was sent. The contents of the letter, 
without adequate foundation, are hearsay. Ms. Simpson has not provided any 
information in her affidavit about how she knows this letter is the same as the letter sent 
to the district, therefore, there is insufficient foundation to consider the letter except as 
hearsay and thus, the Court will grant the Respondent's motion and will strike that 
Portion of Paragraph 15 that relates to the content of Exhibit C. 
Ill. Justiciability 
A. Standing 
Respondent argues that Plaintiff has not established standing and that the issue is 
moot since the contracts have been fully executed. While an association may have 
standing in its own right, it must establish an injury to itself to justify any relief. Glengary-
Gamlin Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Bird, 106 Idaho 84, 87, 675 P.2d 344, 347 (Ct. App. 
1983). (Ct. App. 1983) citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2213 
(1975). 
The three most basic propositions of the doctrine of standing that our 
Court uses to guide its decisions were outlined in Boundary Backpackers 
v. Boundary County as being (1) that standing "focuses on the party 
seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated;" 
(2) that in order "to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of 
standing, litigants generally must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact 
and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or 
redress the claimed injury;" and (3) that "a citizen and taxpayer may not 
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challenge a governmental enactment where the injury is one suffered alike 
by all citizens and taxpayers of the jurisdiction." 
128 Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996) (quoting Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 
116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989)). Standing may be predicated upon 
either a threatened harm or a past injury. In re Jerome Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 153 Idaho 
298, 308, 281 P.3d 1076, 1086 (2012) citing Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 
133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006). "There is no question that an association may have 
standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate 
whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy. Bear Lake Educ. Ass'n, 
By & through Belnap v. Bd. of Trustees of Bear Lake Sch. Dist. No. 33, 116 Idaho 443, 
448, 776 P.2d 452,457 (1989). 
The only injury alleged in the Petition is that the Addendum was not on a form 
approved by the State Board of Education. The Memoranda, both in opposition to the 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, and in Support of the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, reference Idaho Code § 33-513(1) and the public policy reasons 
that such an Addendum is, in essence, part of the contract for employment. 
In order to establish standing based on a statutory violation, the Petitioner must 
show "a direct nexus between the vindication of [its] interest and the enforcement of the 
[statute]," Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,619, 93 S. Ct. 1146, 1149, 35 L. Ed. 
2d 536 (1973), in order to insure that "the relief requested would redress appellant's 
claimed injury." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 
167,203, 120 S. Ct. 693, 716, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (U.S.S.C. 2000). 
In this case, the association has asserted as injury the District's failure to comply 
with Idaho Code § 33-513. At the time the Continuing Teacher Contracts and the 
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Addendum were executed, the Petitioner was "the sole representative of the teacher 
employees of the District and is the medium through which individual teachers 
collectively seek to reach first a negotiation agreement and later a Master Agreement 
with the Board of Trustees of [Nampa] School District." Bear Lake Educ. Ass'n, By & 
through Belnap v. Bd. of Trustees of Bear Lake Sch. Dist. No. 33, 116 Idaho 443, 448, 
776 P.2d 452, 457 (1989). Although a Master Contract was never formalized, the 
negotiation of wage or compensation contracts, and insistence that local boards comply 
with §33-513, is still within the exclusive province of the Petitioner and therefore, a 
contract purporting to affect wage and compensation would be injurious to Petitioner if it 
was not properly negotiated. As such, Petitioner has an interest in ensuring that 
contracts entered into between the teachers and the local board comply with statutory 
requirements. In this case, a declaration that the Addendum Contract is illegal would 
adequately redress Petitioner's injury - that the contract fails to comply with I.C. § 33-
513. As such, the Petitioners have established standing in this case.4 
4 In order to establish standing on behalf of its members, the Organization must 
establish all three of the following elements: "(a) its members would otherwise have 
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the 
organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted, nor the relief requested, 
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Id. at 88, 675 P.2d at 
348. When an association seeks standing for its members, the association must allege 
that at least one of its members face injury and could meet the requirements of standing 
on an individual basis. In re Jerome Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 153 Idaho 298, 308, 281 
P.3d 1076, 1086 (2012), citing Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n, Inc. v. State ex rel. Andrus, 
127 Idaho 239, 241-42, 899 P.2d 949, 951-52 (1995). "As the record does not 
include any indication that Friends of Minidoka had a member who was an affected 
party suffering potential harm to real estate in the area surrounding the proposed LCO 
site, Friends of Minidoka cannot meet the first requirement for associational standing-no 
member has standing to sue in their own right." Id. at 298, 281 P.3d at 1088. 
Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to assert standing on behalf of its 
individual members. Unlike the organizations in In re Jerome County Bd. of Com'rs, in 
this case, there is nothing in the Record that lists or otherwise indicates the membership 
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B. Mootness 
The Respondent argues that the issue in this case is moot because the contracts 
have been fully executed and therefore, no relief is available. Petitioners argue that the 
relief requested can be granted through the declaration and thus, the issue is not moot. 
The general rule of mootness doctrine is that, to be justiciable, an issue must 
present a real and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded through a 
judicial decree of specific relief. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State 
Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281-82, 912 P.2d 644, 649-50 (1996). 
Furthermore, the controversy must be live at the time of the court's hearing. Id. at 
282, 912 P.2d at 650. If, however, the issues presented are no longer live and if the 
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, those issues are not justiciable, 
but are moot and thereby preclude review. Id. at 281, 912 P.2d at 649. A party lacks a 
legally cognizable interest in the outcome when even a favorable judicial decision would 
not result in relief. See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481-82, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 1183, 71 
L.Ed.2d 353, 356-57 (1982). Freeman v. Idaho Dep't of Correction, 138 Idaho 872, 875, 
71 P.3d 471, 474 (Ct. App. 2003). 
"An action for declaratory judgment is moot where the judgment, if granted, 
would have no effect either directly or collaterally on the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be 
unable to obtain further relief based on the judgment and no other relief is sought in the 
action." Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity By & Through Eikum v. Idaho State Bd. 
of the Plaintiff organization included any one of the teachers who signed the Addendum 
Contract. If the Petitioner had alleged and supported by facts that any one of its 
members signed the Addendum Contract, then it would have met the first prong of the 
test. However, failing to specifically allege that an identified member of the association 
has suffered, or will suffer, an injury deprives the Plaintiff organization of standing on 
this basis. 
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of Educ. By & Through Mossman, 128 Idaho 276, 282, 912 P.2d 644, 650 (1996), citing 
22A Am.Jur.2d Declaratory Judgments § 41 (1988). The existence of the required 
elements for declaratory relief, including the existence of a "controversy," should be 
determined as of the time of the court's trial or hearing, rather than at the 
commencement of the action. See, e.g., Golden v. Zwick/er, 394 U.S. 103, 108, 89 S.Ct. 
956, 959, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969)." 
In this case, Petitioner has not asked for any relief except to have the contracts 
declared illegal. However, if the relief asked for is granted, that declaration would have 
an effect - either directly or collaterally - as Petitioner can thereafter use the 
declaration, if granted, to prevent future types of contracts. Additionally, if the 
Addendum Contract is determined to be illegal, Petitioner could seek further relief on 
behalf of its members. As such, although the contracts have been fully executed, the 
issue is not moot. 
IV. Motion for Summary Judgment 
Under l.R.C.P. 56(c), the Plaintiff shall be entitled to summary judgment if the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986). In 
determining whether an issue of material fact exists, all disputed facts are liberally 
construed and all reasonable inferences made in favor of the non-moving party. G&M 
Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P/2d 851 (1991). If the record 
contains conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds could differ, summary 
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judgment should not be granted. Sewell v. Neilson Monroe, Inc., 109 Idaho 192, 706 
P.2d 81 (Ct.App.1985). This requirement is a strict one. Clarke v Prenger, 114 Idaho 
766, 760 P .2d 1182 ( 1988). The burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests 
at all times upon the moving party. G&M Farms v Funk, supra. This burden is onerous 
because even "circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact." 
Doe v Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986). 
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue, the burden 
shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact on the 
challenged element of their claim does exist. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e); Kiebert v. Goss, 
144 Idaho 225, 228, 159 P.3d 862, 865 (2007); Navarrete v. City of Caldwell, 130 Idaho 
849, 949 P.2d 597 (Ct.App.1997). The opposing party's case must not rest on mere 
speculation because a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine 
issue of fact. G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., supra; Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 
841,846,216 P.3d 130,135 (2009). If the Plaintiff fails to submit evidence to establish 
an essential element of his claim, summary judgment is appropriate. Post Falls Trailer 
Park v. Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634, 962 P.2d 1018 (1998). Moreover, a party against 
whom a motion for summary judgment is sought may not merely rest on allegations 
contained in his pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence by way of 
deposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions of the moving party and establish a 
genuine issue of material fact. Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342,941 P.2d 314 
(1997); See also I.R.C.P. 56(c). Failure to do so will result in an order granting 
summary judgment. The district court is not required to search the record for evidence 
of an issue of material fact; it is the nonmoving party's burden to bring that evidence to 
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the court's attention. Vreeken v. Lockwood, Eng'g, B. V., 148 Idaho 89, 103-04, 218 P.3d 
1150, 1164-65 (2009). Failure to do so will result in an order granting summary 
judgment. Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 941 P.2d 314 (1997). 
The fact that both parties file motions for summary judgment does not 
necessarily mean that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Moss 
v. Mid-Am. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298,302,647 P.2d 754, 758 
(1982). Moreover, the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does 
not transform "the court, sitting to hear a summary judgment motion, into 
the trier of fact." Id. When cross-motions have been filed and the action 
will be tried before the court without a jury, however, the court may, in 
ruling on the motions for summary judgment, draw probable inferences 
arising from the undisputed evidentiary facts. Riverside Dev. Co. v. 
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982); see also Drew v. 
Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534, 537, 989 P.2d 276, 279 (1999). Drawing 
probable inferences under such circumstances is permissible since the 
court, as the trier of fact, would be responsible for resolving conflicting 
inferences at trial. Ritchie, 103 Idaho at 519, 650 P.2d at 661. Conflicting 
evidentiary facts, however, must still be viewed in favor of the nonmoving 
party. Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670, 691 P.2d 1283, 1285 
(Ct.App.1984). 
Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 123-24, 
206 P.3d 481, 487-88 (2009). When both parties file a motion for summary judgment 
relying upon the same facts, issues, and theories, the parties essentially stipulate that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact which would preclude the district court from 
entering summary judgment. Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189,191,923 P.2d 434,436 
(1996). Hunting v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 161, 129 Idaho 634, 637, 931 P.2d 628, 
631 (1997). 
At issue in this case is whether the Addendum Contract is a contract pursuant to 
I.C. § 33-513(1 ), which provides in pertinent part: 
The board of trustees of each school district, including any specially 
chartered district, shall have the following powers and duties: 
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1 To employ professional personnel, on written contract in form 
approved by the state superintendent of public instruction. 
Petitioners assert that this contract was an employment contract, but that it was not on 
an approved form as required by statute and therefore, was an illegal contract. 
Respondents argue that it was not an employment contract and therefore, was not 
required to be on any approved form and, consequently, is perfectly legal. Both parties 
agree that the Continuing Teachers Contract complied with Idaho Code § 33-513 and 
that the Addendum Contract was an "Addendum to Continuing Teacher Contract." 
Whether a contract is illegal is a question of law for the court to determine from 
all the facts and circumstances of each case. Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d 
765, 768 (2002). The illegality of a contract can be raised at any stage in litigation. Id. In 
fact, the court has the duty to raise the issue of illegality sua sponte. Id. Whether a 
contract violates a statute is a question of statutory interpretation and is a matter of law 
for the Court to determine from all the facts and circumstances of each case. Id .. 
Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. 
Paolini v. Albertson's, Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 549, 149 P.3d 822, 824 (2006). 
The statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be given 
their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. Id. When the statutory language 
is unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute must be given effect, and 
the court need not consider rules of statutory construction. Payette River 
Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 
557, 976 P.2d 477, 483 (1999). It should be noted that the court must give 
effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none will be 
void, superfluous, or redundant. AmeriTel Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello-
Chubbuck Auditorium Dist., 146 Idaho 202, 204, 192 P.3d 1026, 1028 
(2008). 
Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 282, 207 P.3d 1008, 
1013 (2009). 
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A contract made for the purpose of furthering any matter prohibited by statute is 
illegal, unenforceable, and void. Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 611, 990 
P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct.App.1999) (citing Porter v. Canyon County Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., 45 Idaho 522, 525, 263 P. 632, 633 (1928)). When a court is faced with an illegal 
contract, it denies enforcement of the contract. Trees, 138 Idaho at 9, 56 P.3d at 771. 
According to Black's Law Dictionary: addendum is "a thing that is added." To 
employ means "to engage in one's service; to hire." To hire "implies a request and a 
contract for compensation." 
In this case, Respondent's conceded at oral argument that the Addendum 
Contract was part of the employment contract and it attempted to, and in fact, did, 
modify the Contract by reducing the amount of compensation agreed upon in the 
Contract. Employment contracts are required to be on a form approved by the state 
superintendent of public instruction pursuant to I.C. § 33-513. This Addendum 
purported to reduce the compensation afforded to the teachers and to remove the 
protections of I.C. § 33-513 without any indication that it did so in a form approved by 
either the State Superintendent of Public Instruction or the State Board of Education. 
Therefore, the Addendum Contract is ineffective at altering the terms of the Continuing 
Teacher Salaries and is void. 
On a separate ground, this Court finds the Addendum Contract is illegal because 
it failed to comply with Idaho Code§§ 33-1272 and -1273. Various Idaho Code sections 
are relevant to this analysis: 
I.C. § 33-1272(3) provides in pertinent part: 
negotiations means meeting and conferring ... by the local board of 
trustees and the authorized local education organization or the respective 
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designated representatives of both parties for the purpose of reaching an 
agreement upon matters and conditions subject to negotiations as 
specified in a negotiation agreement between said parties. 
Section 33-1272(1) defines a professional employee as a "certificated employee," which 
includes teachers and I.C. § ;33-1273(1) requires that: 
"the local education organization selected by a majority of the qualifying 
professional employees shall be the exclusive representative for all 
professional employees in the district for purposes of negotiations. A local 
board of trustees or its designated representative shall negotiate matters 
covered by a negotiations agreement only with the local education 
organization or its designated representative. 
Finally, Idaho Admin. Code r. 08.02.01 .150: states, 'The State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction has approved a standard employment contract form. Any deviation from this 
contract form must be approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and 
reviewed for reapproval once every three (3) years. (Section 33-513, Idaho Code) (4-1-
97). 
There is a complex set of statutory provisions governing the process by which 
teachers' salaries, benefits and employment conditions are negotiated. " ... [T]he 
procedures set forth in I.C. §§ 33-1271 to -1276 reflect the legislature's determination 
that structured negotiation procedures would benefit not only school districts and 
teachers, but the public as well. Gilbert v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 104 Idaho 137, 
147,657 P.2d 1, 11 (1983). 
At oral argument, both parties agreed that the number of working days and the 
commensurate salary are issues usually negotiated by the local board and the 
education association. Here there was an agreement apparently between the school 
superintendent human resource officer and individual teachers. The school 
superintendent, individually or through the human resource officer, did not have the 
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statutory authority to negotiate a reduced salary or wages unless he was designated by 
the local board of trustees but even so, the designee of the local board can only 
negotiate matters covered by the negotiation agreement with the local education 
organization or its designee. 
Here, the school superintendent, in presenting individual teachers with a variety 
of days, and allowing teachers to select a specific number of days to furlough and then 
to subsequently modify the number of agreed-upon furlough days, was negotiating with 
individual teachers regarding the compensation each teacher would forego based on 
the number of days the teacher agreed to furlough. This negotiation is specifically 
precluded under the statute. Moreover, the superintendent is deemed to know that the 
individual teachers had no authority to negotiate in this fashion and thus, he 
superintendent had no justifiable reason to believe the individual teachers had the 
authority to enter into contracts that altered their wage or compensation when such 
contract was negotiated outside the statutory process. Brown v. Caldwell Sch. Dist. No. 
132,127 Idaho 112, 117-118, 898 P.2d 43, 48049 (1995). 
Because the individual teachers entering the contracts did not have the authority 
to contract for reduced wages or compensation when such reduction was negotiated 
outside the statutory procedure, there was a lack of authority to contract, rendering the 
Addendum Contracts void. 146 Idaho 527 (2008) citing Woodward v. City of 
Grangeville, 13 Idaho 652 (1907). 
As such, because the Addendum Contracts do not comply with I.C. §§ 33-513 or 
33-1272 and -1273, this Court finds the Addendum Contracts are unenforceable and 
therefore, grants Petitioner's motion for summary judgment. 
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THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Petitioner's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is GRANTED and Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
Dated: August \v , 2013. 
M 1lyJ. Huy -
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
vs. 
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2013-2962-C 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
) 
) Filing Fee Category: L4 
) Filing Fee: $109.00 
) 
--------------~) 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, 
AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, PAUL J. ST ARK; AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN TH.AT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, appeals 
against the above-named Respondent, NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the Order on Summary Judgment entered on the 16th day of August, 2013, the 
Honorable Molly J. Huskey presiding. 
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2. Appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Order 
described in paragraph 1 is appealable, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(l). See Goodman Oil 
Co. v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. 148 Idaho 588,591,226 P.3d 530,533 (2010). 
3. In the event the Idaho Supreme Court finds the Order is not appealable pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (a)(l ), Appellant requests, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(2), that this 
appeal becomes valid upon the filing and placing of the stamp of the Clerk of the Court on such 
appealable judgment or order, without re-filing this Notice of Appeal. 
4. Appellant intends to assert a number of issues, including but not limited to the 
following: 
a. Did the District Court err in finding that the negotiation of wages or 
compensation and the compliance with Idaho Code Section 33-513 was within the specific 
purview of the Nampa Education Association ("NEA"), notwithstanding the fact that there 
was no master agreement existing between the NEA and Nampa School District No. 131 
("Nampa")? 
b. Did the District Court err in finding that a contract purporting to affect wage 
and compensation, if not properly negotiated, would be injurious to the NEA? 
c. Did the District Court err in finding that the NEA had an interest in ensuring 
that all voluntary addendum contracts entered into between teachers and local school boards 
comply with Idaho Section 33-513? 
d. Did the District Court err in finding that a declaration determining the 
voluntary addendum contracts were illegal would adequately redress any injury suffered by 
the NEA? 
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e. Did the District Court err in finding that a declaration determining the 
voluntary addendum contracts were illegal would have an effect, either directly or 
collaterally, as the NEA could prevent future use of such contracts? 
f. Did the District Court err in finding that a declaration determining the 
voluntary addendum contracts were illegal would allow the NEA to seek further relief on 
behalf of its members? 
g. Did the District Court err in finding that the NEA had standing to bring a 
petition for summary judgment? 
h. Did the District Court err in finding that the full performance of the 
voluntary addendum contracts did not render the matter moot? 
1. Did the District Court err in finding that the voluntary addendum contracts 
were void as a matter oflaw for failure to comply with Idaho Code Section 33-513? 
J. Did the District Court err in finding that the voluntary addendum contracts 
were ineffective at altering the terms of continuing salaries ( continuing contract salaries) 
and, therefore, were void? 
k. Did the District Court err in finding that Nampa, in requesting teachers to 
volunteer furlough days, was "negotiating" with individual teachers and such action was 
precluded by statute? 
1. Did the District Court err in finding the voluntary addendum contracts to be 
illegal for failure to comply with Idaho Code Section 33-1272, et seq.? 
m. Did the District Court err in finding that the Superintendent of Nampa was 
deemed to have knowledge that individual teachers had no authority to volunteer furlough 
days for the benefit of Nampa? 
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n. Did the District Court err in finding that individual teachers had no authority 
to volunteer furlough days, and, therefore, the voluntary addendum contracts were void as a 
matter of law? 
5. Appellant requests the reporter's standard transcript from the hearing on Appellant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Respondent's cross-Motion for Summary Judgment held on 
August 1, 2013. 
6. Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's record, in 
addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28: 
a. Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
b. Affidavit of Steve Kipp in Support of Appellant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
c. Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment; 
d. Affidavit of Mandy Simpson m Support of Respondent's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
e. Appellant's Reply Memorandum to Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
f. Respondent's Memorandum m Opposition to Appellant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
g. Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Memorandum m Opposition to 
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
h. Respondent's Reply Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
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appeal. 
7. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
8. No additional charts or pictures offered or admitted as exhibits are requested in this 
9. It is certified: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter, 
Laura Whiting, at the following address: 
Laura Whiting, Court Reporter 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
b. That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee of 
$200.00 for preparation of the reporter's transcript, subject to adjustments or receipt from 
the Clerk's office of an estimate of cost; 
c. That the estimated fee for the preparation of the Clerk's record in the amount 
of $100.00 has been paid, subject to adjustment or receipt from the Clerk's office of an 
estimate of cost; 
d. That the appellate filing fee of $109.00 has been paid; 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED this 27th day of September, 2013. 
YOST LAW, PLLC 
By: ___ /;_;----__________ _ 
Chip Giles 
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2ih day of September, 2013, I caused to be served by the 
method indicated below a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon: 
Paul J. Stark U.S. Mail -
Idaho Education Association _Overnight Mail 
620 North 6th St _Hand Delivery 
PO Box 2638 .x_ Facsimile No. 344-1606 
Boise, ID 83701 
Laura Whiting, Court Reporter U.S. Mail 
Canyon County Courthouse __ Overnight Mail 
1115 Albany Street _Hand Delivery 
Caldwell, ID 83605 .x_ Facsimile No. 454-7525 
Chip Giles 
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In the Supreme Court of the State o D _____ P.M. 
NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCfATION, 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
V. 














ORDER REMANDING TO DISTRICT 
COURT 
Supreme Court Docke1 No. 41454-2013 
Canyon County No. 2013-2962 
This appeal is from the ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT file stamped in the District 
Court on August 16, 2013. It appears that a Judgment as required by Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure 54(a) has yet to be entered. Therefore, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 11 (a\ l '.LL and 
17(e)(2), the above-entitled matter be, and hereby is, REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT 
and proceedings in this appeal shall be SUSPENDED to allow for the entry of a FINAL 
JUDGMENT. Upon entry of the FTNAL JUDGMENT by the District Coun, the District Court 
Clerk is directed to transmit a certified copy of the FINAL JUDGMENT to this Court. at which 
time this appeal shall proceed accordingly. 
h 
DATED this _11!.. day of October, 2013. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Reporter 
District Court Judge 
For the Supreme Court 
Stephe~ W. Kcny~, Clerk 
ORDER REMANDING TO DISTRICT COURT Docket No. 41454-2013 
0001.24 
\ L ~flQ .. 
_,.A.M.- I/ /VU' t"',IVI. ---F 
OCT \ 7 201! 
COUNTY "'1,,,i!RK CANYON · ~ ..... 
c.oVE,OiPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
NAMPA EDUACATION ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 










) _________________ ) 
CASE NO. CV-2013-2962 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Pursuant to the Order on Summary Judgment issued on August 16, 2013: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment is entered in 
favor of Petitioner, which is granted the declaratory relief that the Addendum Contracts are 
determined to be unlawful and unenforceable. 
1-i'Y" Dated this 'O day of October, 2013. 
FINAL JUDGMENT 1 
000125 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was forwarded 
to the following persons on this ffaay of October, 2013: 
Paul J. Stark 
Idaho Education Association 
620 N. 6th Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
William F. Yost 
Chip Giles 
Yost Law, PLLC 
4 Ogden Ave. 




William F. Yo~t, ISB No 1242 
Chip Giles, TSB No. 9135 
YOST LAW, PLLC 
4 Ogden Avenue 
PO Box 1275 





Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant 
;_,~--- ,1,,_,,_,J._,,_,..J_ 
L E D 
A.M, ____ P.M 
NOV O 1 2013 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTR1CT 
Of' THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
NAMPA EDl1CATION ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
vs. 
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
} 
) Case No. CV 2013-2962-C 
) 






TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, 
AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, PAUL J. STARK; AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
l. The above-named Appellant, NA.MP A SCHOOL DISTRJCT NO. 131, appeals 
against the above-named Respondent, NAJvlPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the Order on Summary Judgment entered on the 16°1 day of August> 2013., the 
Honorable Molly J. Huskey presiding. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
0001.27 
2. Appellant has the right to appeal to the fdaJ-10 Supreme Court frc,m the Final 
Judgment entered by the Distric1 Court on October 17, 2013, puNllUll to Idah.1 Appellate Rtlle 
l l(a)(l), Appealab!e Judg1nent'.i and Orders. 
3. Appellant intends to assert a number of i~sues, including but not limited to the 
follo"ving: 
,,. Did the District Cou:rr err m finding thar the negotiation of wages or 
compensatkm and tbe compli.ance with ldah() Code Section 3:1-513 was within the specific 
purview of the Nampa Edtication AssodatH.111 CNEA"), notwithstanding the fact that thtre 
w&S no master agreement existing between the NEA a..+-id Nampa Sch()t)l Dif.trict No. 131 
("Nampa")? 
h Did the District Court err in finding that a contract purporting to affect wage 
and compensation, if wt properly negotiated, would be injurious to the NE.A? 
c. Did the District Court err in finding that the NEA had an interest in easuring 
tha1 all voh.1.ntary addendum contracts entered into beh-v,;en teachers and local school boards 
comply with Ida!.}) Section 33-513? 
cL Did rlie District Court err in finding that a dedaraticm ddemiin.ing the: 
voluntary addendum contracts -,vere illegal \vo,;ld adequately redress a:1y injury suffered by 
theNEA? 
e. Did the Di:,,trict Court err m finding drnt a declaration detemun.ing the 
volunt:try addendum contracts were illegal '.\mud have an etfoct, tither directly or 
collaterally, as the NEA co1.tld prevent future usi; of such contracts? 
f Did the District Court err m finding that a declaration determining th;;' 
voluntary adJendum contrite ts were illegal would :;illow the NEA to teek further rdief on 
behalf of its members? 
A.ML!-,;DED NOllCS OF APPEAL - 2 
....,,._, _, ,.I, '-''-'....I. _,,.j ...\., 
g. Did the DistTict Court err it1 finding that the N'F.A had standing to bring a 
petition for smnrnary judgment? 
h. Did the Disuict Court err in finding that the foll performance of rhe 
voluntary addendum contracts did not render the matter moor? 
L Did the District Court err in finding that the Yolu11tary addcndLUn corl':racts 
were vc,id as a matter oflaw for failure to comply with Idaho Code Section 33-513? 
j. Did the District Court err in finding thm the volunt:::ry addendum contracts 
were ineffective at altering the tenns of continuing salaries (continuing contrac1 salaries) 
and, therefore, were ,oid'? 
k. Did the District Court en in fhding that Nampa, ir. requesting teachers tc 
volunteer furlough days, was "negotiating'' ,.vi.th indiv1dual teache.rs ,;,J1d s1teh action \Vas 
precluded by ~tatute? 
l. Did the District Court err in finding the vobntary adder.du:n ..:cmrncts to be 
illegal for faibre to comply with Idaho Code Section 33-127:, cl seq.? 
111. Did the District Court err in finding that the Superintend.::nt of Nampa was 
deemed to have knowledge that individual teachers. had no authority tv wlunteer furk,u1..J1 
days for the be11efit of Nampa? 
n. Did lhe Di:;trict Court ~rr in finding that individual teachers had nc, aalhority 
to vol or.teer furlough days, and, therefore, the Yoluntary addendum contracts were void as a 
matter of law? 
o. Did the D1!;trict Court err in dismissing Appellant':.:: \1ction fl_ir Sununary 
Judgn1e11t? 
AMENDED NOTCCE OF APPEAL 3 
4. Appellant requests the reporter's standard transcript from the hearing on Appellant's 
Motion for Stunntflry Judgment and Respondent\ cross-Motion for Surnmary Judgment held on 
August 1, 2013. 
5. Appellant rrquest._;; the following documents to b,~ included in the Clerk's record, in 
addition to those automatically indudu1 under Idaho Appellate Rule 28: 
a. Appellant':; l\fotion for Sununary Judgrnern and Memo:andmu u1 Support of 
Moticn for Summary Judgment; 
b. Affidavit of Steve Kipp in Support of Appellan~' s Mc1tion for Summary 
Judf;ment; 
c. Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment anJ \1ernorandurn in Support 
of \101ion for Summ,:rry JJJgrnem; 
d. Affidavit of Mandy Simpson m Support of Respondent's Motion for 
Summary J udgmern:; 
e. Appelhmt's Reply Memorandum to Respondent's fl.foiion for Summary 
Judgment; 
f. Respondent's Memorandrnn in Opposition to Appellan:'s Morion tor 
Summary Judgment; 
g Appellant's Repiy to Respondent's Menwrandum m Opposition to 
Appdlrnt's Motion for Sunu11a1y Judgment; 
h. Respondent's Reply Memorandrnn in Support of Re$Th)ndent's Motion for 
Surnmary Judgment. 
6. Ne, order has been entered sealing all or any p·Jrtkm of the rncc<rd. 
7. I\o additional charts 0r pictures offered or adn'Ll.ttcd as exhibits are requested in this 
appeal. 
A:t,.1ENDED 1'~0T!CE OF APPEAL - 4 
8. It is certified: 
a. That a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal ha.;, b:::t:n ~erved on the c011rt 
repo1ter, Laura Vlhiti.ng, at the following addrtsss: 
Laura \Vr...iting, Court Reporter 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldweli, ID 83605 
b. lbat the Clerk \)f t.1-i.e District Court hct.<, been paid the esrimated foe of 
$2~HJ.D(J D:!r prc::paratiou of the reporter's transcript, subject to adjustments or 1eceipt fiom 
the C!er!::'s office of an estimate t.1f cost; 
c. That the esti.rnukd fee for the preparafo.:,11 of the Clerk's rte:ord irr th? amount 
of $100.0(• has been paid subject ~o adjustment or receipt 1rc•m the Uerk's oftfo: of an 
estimate of rosl; 
d "That the appellate filing foe of$109.00 has been paid; 
c. That service ha.--i been made upon all pc'Lrties requirec to be s~rved pursuant to 
Idaho AppellHte Rule 20. 
I
p;. 
DATED this dav of November, 2013. --·- .,. 
YOST LAW, PLLC 
By: /J------ ---
Chip Gile:-:i 
Auomeys for Resp,)ndenH\ppellant 
Mlffi-r-.'DED NO'TICE OF APPEAL • 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
; ).._ 
I hereby certify that on this _ _j._:__ day of Kovember1 2013, I caused to be served by the 
method indicated below a true aud correct eopy of the foregoing d()cmnent upon: 
I Paw}. Stark ·---·---i--u-.-S.-h-1aIT ________ _ 
i Idaho Education Association 1 ___ ,Overnight Mail 
i 620 North 601 St / -:-_Hand Delivery 
l PO Box 2638 \ X Facsimile No. 344-1606 
l Boise, ID 83701 1 
h=aura .Whiti~;g,Court R-ep;;?ter 1 -7:Is. M-~-ai-1 ___ _ 
I: C. anyon County. Counhouse 1115 Albany Street 
. Caldwell. 1D 83605 I . 
'. Overnight Mail 
· ::·-Hand Delivery 
X Facsimile No. 454~ 7525 '--· 
I 
L---·-·----------------~·-·"-------------· .. --.---... 
---------------
Chip Gile:; 
AMENDED NOT!CE OF APPEAL· 6 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF CANYON 
NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
-vs-











Case No. CV-13-02962*C 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT 
I, CHRIS YAM.A.MOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following 
is being sent as an exhibit: 
NONE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ___ day of December, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
u.vy_....,,,. the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
-vs-











Case No. CV-13-02962*C 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
I, CHRISY AMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction as, and is a true, correct Record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules and as requested in the Amended Notice of Appeal. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ___ day of December, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 






NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, ) 
) 
Respondent-Appellant. ) 
Supreme Court No. 41454-2013 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRIS YAM..t\MOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcript to the attorney of record to each 
party as follows: 
William F. Yost and Chip Giles, YOST LAW, PLLC. 
Paul J. Stark, Idaho Education Association 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this _~_r: __ day of December, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
~ .... ~·r-v~ the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
